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ABSTRACT 




Pricing practices of firms are an important yet little studied aspect of the price 
phenomenon in sociology. This study asks the question: Why do different firms, even in 
the same market, tend to use different pricing practices—value-informed, competition-
informed, or cost-informed pricing—to set prices? To answer this question, this study 
builds a dynamic flocking model of pricing to investigate the inter-dynamics among 
pricing practices and various market uncertainties. The model shows that each pricing 
practice is only viable under certain combinations of levels of different market 
uncertainties. Supporting evidence, theoretical innovations, and practical implications of 
the model are discussed. Contrary to common intuition, uncertainty, conceptualized as 
some cognitive tolerance interval, is akin to lubricant, making the otherwise rigid, brittle, 
and friction-fraught system more smooth, robust, and error-tolerant under certain 
circumstances. Therefore, uncertainties, and the inter-dynamics among them, should be 
treated as an endogenous and integral part of the social mechanism at issue, rather than 
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Price has been a core variable in economics. For neoclassical economics, the law 
of supply and demand is about determining the equilibrium price; for the Austrian 
economists, price is the capsule carrier of market information crucial to the functioning of 
markets either in or off equilibrium (Hayek, 1945; Kirzner, 1973). In contrast, price 
receives only limited and fragmented attention in the current literature of sociology (Uzzi 
and Lancaster, 2004; Zhao, 2008). “In many studies on markets coming out of economic 
sociology, prices are not mentioned at all” (Beckert, 2011, p. 3), and this has been 
recognized as a “profound shortcoming” (Beckert, 2011; Uzzi and Lancaster 2004), 
especially considering the significant position of the sociology of markets in economic 
sociology (Carruthers and Uzzi, 2000; Fligstein and Dauter, 2007; Fourcade, 2007). 
Sociologists’ reluctance to study prices may be traced back to Max Weber, who explicitly 
states that price formation (dickering) “essentially constitutes the content of economics” 
(Weber, [1922] 1978, p. 635). Given their predominant significance in markets and 
economic life, the discussion of prices, for economic sociology, thus becomes “a litmus 
test for its ability to demonstrate the importance of distinctively social dimensions in the 
most conventional economic practices” (Yakubovich, Granovetter, and McQuire, 2005, p. 
579). This dissertation advances the fledging sociological theory of prices. 
 
The Price Phenomenon and Pricing Practices 
There are, roughly speaking, three lines of researches in economic sociology (and 
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social sciences in general) that are relevant to this study on the price phenomenon.1
 The second line of research studies price mechanisms, that is, how factors and 
forces at the market and inter-firm level (such as competition, supply and demand, 
institutions, and networks) determine price. Price mechanisms have been traditionally the 
territory of economics and only played a limited role in economic sociology. The third 
line’s research object is pricing practices, i.e., the organizational procedures/processes 
 The 
first concerns the qualification and valuation of goods in markets (e.g., Callon, Méadel, 
and Rabeharisoa 2002; Callon and Muniesa 2005; Fourcade 2011; Muniesa 2012; Stark 
2009; Zelizer 1978, 1994, 2004). This line of research addresses (1) whether or not the 
cultural and moral values of “goods” allow them to legitimately enter market exchange 
and be attached with prices in the first place, and (2) how goods are qualified and their 
economic values are assessed by market actors (producers, sellers, buyers, and various 
intermediaries) through comparison—i.e., establishing similarities and differences among 
goods—facilitated by various technological, cognitive, social and market devices. 
Qualification and valuation of products are the aspect of the price phenomenon that has 
recently received the most attention in economic sociology. However, while the values 
and valuation of goods analytically constitute the conditions for market exchange and 
price formation, this line of research usually says little about how, exactly, a specific 
quantitative price is “translated” from various largely qualitative values (Aspers and 
Beckert 2012). This issue of translating values into prices is addressed by the other two 
lines of research, which focus on social mechanisms at market (inter-firm) and 
organizational (intra-firm) levels, respectively. 
                                                             
1 See Beckert (2011) and Aspers and Beckert (2012) for more comprehensive reviews of sociological 
studies on the price phenomenon. 
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and information employed within a firm to reach pricing decisions. Different from price 
mechanisms, which are active and visible at the market level, pricing practices are hidden 
behind the boundary of the firm and “occur in the context of an organizational process in 
which information is gathered, shared, and interpreted” (Ingenbleek, Debruyne, 
Frambach, and Verhallen 2003).2 Pricing practices are the least studied aspect of the price 
phenomenon in economic sociology, but they are by no means the least important 
(Beckert 2011). Practically, pricing practices concern the organizational profiting 
capacity of the firm to effectively (or not) reap the economic rents from the values it 
creates in its products by setting the “right” prices (Dutta, Zbaracki, and Bergen, 2003). 
Thus, knowledge of pricing practices would have important implications about how a 
firm can enhance its profiting ability and gain competitive advantage by optimizing its 
pricing practices. Theoretically, pricing practices together with price mechanisms 
constitute the two intertwined pathways at the organizational and market levels, 
respectively, through which values of goods are “translated” into prices.3
This dissertation therefore focuses on pricing practices as the main object of 
 Prices are, after 
all, set through the “visible hands” of firms and sellers, rather than directly “conjured” by 
the “invisible hands” of price mechanisms.  
                                                             
2 Pricing practices should also be distinguished from pricing strategies. The latter pertain to price 
mechanisms; they are the results of market-level forces and usually modeled using game theory. Pricing 
strategy refers to a firm’s short-term calculative strategy of setting prices to achieve specific market goals 
(for example, to increase its market share, or to deter the entry of new firms). A price war between two 
firms is an example of pricing strategy. For a given firm, pricing strategy usually changes often, as it is very 
responsive to market change. In contrast, pricing practice refers to some more general and stable 
organizational orientation of the firm; what the concept emphasizes is not the final pricing decision/strategy 
itself, but what information is routinely used and how information is usually processed and interpreted 
within the firm for making general pricing decisions (Ingenbleek et al. 2003). 
 
3 There also exists a feedback path from prices to values that closes the loop (e.g., Aspers and Beckert 2012; 
Fourcade 2011). For example, in some cases, high price itself is interpreted by market actors as also 
contributing to the high value of the product, not just the other way around. However, this feedback is not 




research, which aims to restore an indispensible, yet “missing,” link connecting the 
current theoretical focus of economic sociology on values and valuation to the core issue 
of price formation, and thus would enrich the sociological understanding of the price 
phenomenon and the functioning of markets in general.  
The difference between pricing practices and price mechanisms, however, should 
not be essentialized. The two are closely connected: price mechanisms at the inter-firm 
level create the market condition, and they set constraints on pricing practices at the intra-
firm level which in turn lead to pricing decisions. Conversely, the aggregation of the 
pricing decisions made by individual firms through pricing practices reproduce (or 
reshape) the market contour regulated by price mechanisms. In economics, such 
connection is typically treated as perfect. For example, in its extreme version (the 
competitive equilibrium theory), firms are all price takers and thus need not make pricing 
decisions at all—the price mechanism makes pricing decisions for the firms and is the 
pricing practice itself. However, this perfect connection becomes problematic when one 
turns to empirical markets—the pricing processes within firms differ in varying degrees 
from those prescribed by economics (e.g., Hall and Hitch 1939; Dutta et al. 2003; 
MacKenzie, Muniesa, and Siu 2008). [In this sense, pricing practices are potentially an 
important site where the performativity of economics is manifested, mediated, or resisted, 
and thus deserve greater sociological attention.] 
Such discrepancies result in an unfortunate separation between research on price 
mechanisms and that on pricing practices, which should be two sides of one coin. The 
former is mainly conducted in economics, including traditional microeconomics based on 
the assumption of perfect competition and its variants, and the more real-market oriented 
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field of Industrial Organization, where firms are reduced to passive price takers, bio-
automatic imitators, or highly sophisticated game theorists (e.g., Mas-Colell et al. 1995; 
Ania 2008; Tirole 1988).4
The study of pricing practices is largely confined to the field of marketing research 
in business schools (e.g. Cressman 2009; Dutta et al. 2003; Hinterhuber 2008; Ingenbleek 
2007; Ingenbleek et al. 2003). This literature also provides important insights. There are, 
broadly speaking, three different pricing practices (Ingenbleek et al. 2003): a) cost-
informed pricing, i.e., the pricing practices based on a firm’s cost information, aiming to 
cover costs and achieve a target profit margin (see also Hall and Hitch 1939); b) 
competition-informed pricing—the pricing practices in which a firm makes pricing 
decisions by referring to its competitors’ pricing decisions; c) value-informed pricing, 
 Unlike economics, among the few sociological studies on price 
mechanisms that treat price as the dependent variable to be explained, most empirically 
investigate the effects of various social constructs—such as status (Benjamin and 
Podolny 1999; Podolny 1993), embedded ties and board membership (Uzzi and Lancaster 
2004), network size and structure (Baker 1984), industrial categorization (Zuckerman 
1999, 2004), and institutional context (Zhao 2008)—on the level or volatility of price in 
different markets. Despite the valuable insights obtained, these sociological studies have 
serious limitations. Since the models estimated are regression models, they can only be 
interpreted as price-association rather than price-determination models. Moreover, in 
most sociological studies, price is inappropriately isolated from other economic variables, 
such as revenue, cost, output, and profit. After all, price is only one of an array of inter-
related economic variables to be simultaneously determined.  
                                                             
4 For defenses and improvements of these (over)simplified assumptions, see, for example, Alchian (1950), 




which bases pricing decisions on the unique value of the product (compared with other 
products in the market) perceived by consumers, and which can be quantified by 
assessing the amount of money consumers are willing to pay for the product (for example, 
through survey methods).5
Marketing researchers tend to agree that, theoretically, among the three, value-
informed pricing is superior, because it is most effective in collecting economic rents 
from the values created in the products (e.g., Hinterhuber 2008; Ingenbleek 2007; 
Ingenbleek et al. 2003).
  
6
                                                             
5 Note that the pricing practices adopted by any firm tend to be a hybrid of the three, but in most cases there 
is a predominant pricing orientation. 
 However, a puzzle haunting this field is that despite the long-
time promotion of value-informed pricing by marketing scholars and practitioners, only a 
small proportion (less than 20%) of firms are using it—the other two pricing practices are 
still dominant (around 40% each) (Hinterhuber 2008). Marketing researchers usually look 
for explanations at the organizational level, such as insufficient techniques for value 
estimation, poor sales force training, and lack of top management support. These answers 
are unsatisfactory because they focus solely on organizational factors within a firm, 
largely overlooking the effects of price mechanisms at the market level. The “inertia” of 
pricing practices may suggest the viability of different pricing practices depends in part 
on the market environment shaped by price mechanisms, which, if true, further suggests 
there may be no single universally superior pricing practice that should be recommended 
 
6 Although Ingenbleek et al. (2003) advocate a “contingency approach” to the effectiveness of the three 
pricing practices and claim “there are no general ‘best’ or ‘bad’ practices” (p.289), this “contingency” 
seems to only undermine but not at all negate the universal superiority of value-informed pricing. In fact, 
their results even further support its universal superiority: “Unlike cost-informed and competition-informed 
pricing, we find no situation in which value-informed pricing can be considered ‘bad practice.’ The overall 
effect of the simple and interaction effect remains positive or at worst neutral, like in the situation of 
extreme competition. This confirms conventional marketing wisdom that understanding the customer’s 




to all firms unconditionally. 
This puzzle of pricing practices is also pertinent to economic sociology. Value-
informed pricing apparently has connection with the literature on qualification and 
valuation; thus the two literatures may potentially enrich each other, and in particular 
sociological insights may directly contribute to the resolution of the puzzle. More 
importantly, the market competition model (or the W(y) model) developed by Harrison 
White (1981a, 1981b, 2002), one of economic sociology’s fundamental works, 
corresponds to competition-informed pricing, since in the model each firm bases its 
pricing and output decisions on the information of its competitors’ realized prices and 
sales. According to White, the W(y) mechanism, and thus competition-informed pricing, 
should prevail in production markets. However, the existence of different pricing 
practices poses serious challenges to the W(y) model, as only about 40% of firms are 
actually using competition-informed pricing (Hinterhuber 2008). This challenge is most 
clearly illustrated by a recent case study of the Burgundy wine market (Chiffoleau and 
Laporte 2006). Among the thirty one producers in this market, only six adopt pricing 
methods seemingly matching the description of the W(y) model; fifteen producers can be 
classified as using cost-informed pricing; about two to five producers employ value-
informed pricing;7
Then, questions arise: How can one explain the existence of various pricing 
practices in the same market? Among them, is there a universally superior one? If not, 
what are the market conditions for different pricing practices to prevail?  
 the other five producers are simply price takers.  
                                                             
7 Chiffoleau and Laporte seem to be unaware of the marketing literature on pricing practices, so there is 
some ambiguity for my re-classifying the producers into three categories based on the information they 




To answer these questions, as it should be clear now, a theory is needed that cuts 
across all three aspects of the price phenomenon—qualification/valuation of goods, price 
mechanisms, and pricing practices. The strategy adopted here is to build a theoretical 
model with the viability of pricing practices as the output and various conditions of 
qualification/valuation and price mechanisms as the inputs, and then by varying the 
inputs to investigate how the conditions of qualification/valuation and price mechanisms 
affect the viability of pricing practices. More specifically, this study uses the W(y) model 
(White 1981a, b) as a starting point and generalizes it to achieve this goal. The intuition is: 
where the W(y) model fails implies the possible existence of other pricing practices. Thus, 
by specifying the conditions under which the W(y) mechanism is nonviable, the 
conditions under which other pricing practices are viable may be discovered. Although 
the model developed herein is based on the W(y) model, prior knowledge of the W(y) 
model is not necessary for the reader to understand the current model, since this is a fully 
stand-alone generalization that subsumes White’s model as a special case. It also must be 
emphasized that the viability conditions of the W(y) mechanism to be specified in this 
study differ from those already discussed by White. The issue to be addressed here is: not 
all markets (or market segments) judged inhabitable for the W(y) mechanism by White’s 
theory are really inhabitable for the mechanism, as illustrated by the case of the Burgundy 
wine market.8
There are several justifications for choosing this strategy. First, the W(y) model 
 Thus, further conditions are needed for assessing the viability of the W(y) 
mechanism. 
                                                             
8 Even if one argues that the Burgundy wine market actually consists of several smaller markets, these sub-
markets should have similar market parameters, because they are structurally similar. Hence, they are very 
likely to be all judged inhabitable for the W(y) mechanism by White’s theory, but the mechanism only 




can be seen as some price mechanism—firms’ pricing decisions are made within a 
context of market and inter-firm level economic variables. Thus, starting from the W(y) 
model can avoid the aforementioned shortcomings of other sociological studies which 
usually rely on price-association (rather than price-determination) models and 
inappropriately isolate price from other economic variables. Second, although the W(y) 
model represents some price mechanism (as the organizational aspects of firms and 
pricing are assumed away), it has clear implication for the pricing practice associated 
with it—competition-informed pricing.9
However, the W(y) model does have limitations. Most importantly, as a static 
model, it is unable to capture the market dynamics off equilibrium—the normal state of 
markets. As a result, the viability conditions derived by White are only static and thus 
incomplete. This is the very reason why the W(y) mechanism is much less prevalent than 
White’s theory suggests. To address this issue, an alternative dynamic model, called here 
 Third, the model has an explicit component 
modeling the valuation of products by consumers. Fourth, the model deals with the most 
prevailing and general type of markets in real economy—production markets, rather than 
some specific idiosyncratic market (as is the case in most empirical studies). Therefore, 
the W(y) model provides a convenient midpoint for bridging all three aspects of the price 
phenomenon. 
                                                             
9 It is true that, in the W(y) model, firms also need their own cost information when making pricing 
decisions. Yet the predominantly important piece of information is the pricing decisions of competitors, 
while knowledge of cost information is taken for granted. Thus, the W(y) mechanism unmistakably 
corresponds to price-informed pricing. Moreover, although the W(y) mechanism and competition-informed 
pricing are treated here as if interchangeable, they are not identical. First, the W(y) mechanism is, strictly 
speaking, some price mechanism rather than pricing practice. Second, the pricing practice implied by the 
W(y) mechanism is a representative of many possible variants pertaining to the category of competition-
informed pricing. However, unlike game theoretical models of pricing strategy which are highly sensitive 
to the specification of game setting, the W(y) model represents nicely the long-term, general, and stable 
character of the informational aspect of competition-informed pricing. Therefore, practically, this 




the “price flocking model,” is built to derive the dynamic viability conditions. This model 
derives its name from the flocking behaviors of flying birds (wild geese, for instance)—
as discussed in the first chapter, the two share formal similarities. 
Moreover, the W(y) model does not give adequate consideration to uncertainties, 
which play an important role in the survival of pricing practices—it is shown later that 
the dynamic viability conditions have much to do with uncertainties. In order to derive 
the dynamic viability conditions, this study offers 1) formal definitions and measures of a 
variety of relevant market uncertainties, 2) a fine-grained analysis of the inter-dynamics 
among different uncertainties and the social mechanism at issue (price mechanisms and 
pricing practices in this case), and 3) a topology of how the viability of social 
mechanisms may depend on the distribution of different uncertainties. All of these are 
lacking in the current literature. 
 
Re-conceptualizing Uncertainties  
This dissertation also contributes to sociological research on uncertainty. How 
social order emerges from and sustains under uncertainty has been a unifying theme in 
sociology (Beckert 1996, 2011; Finch 2007). In the existing literature, there are, roughly 
speaking, two divergent views. The most common is that uncertainties are “undesirable:” 
these undermine social actors’ ability to make decisions and coordinate with each other, 
and thus constantly threat to disrupt social order (or hinder its emergence). Facing various 
uncertainties, social actors invoke certain social mechanisms or structures—such as 
norms and institutions (DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Durkheim 1947), hierarchies 
(Williamson 1975, 1985), networks (Granovetter 1985; White 2002), Status (Podolny 
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1993, 1994), and calculative devices (Callon and Muniesa 2005)—to reduce uncertainties 
and impose social order (along this line, see also DiMaggio and Louch 1998; Huault and 
Montagner 2009; Peterson 1997; Smith 1990; Uzzi and Lancaster 2004; Velthuis 2003; 
Yogev 2010). The development of the original W(y) model is also motivated by this view 
of uncertainty: the W(y) mechanism is invoked by producers to reduce uncertainty and 
impose market order—such order is named by White (2002) the “interface discipline.”  
In contrast to this “undesirable” picture of uncertainty, a less common view sees 
uncertainties as “desirable,” since the undetermined situations generated by uncertainties 
suggest opportunities for social actors to break free from the over-determined constraints 
of social order and to gain profits and advantages through creative agency and innovation 
(e.g., Knight 1921; Stark 2009; White 2008). These two views of uncertainties 
correspond to two lines of research in the sociology of markets, the first focusing on 
various stabilizing processes that impose market order, while the second on market 
destabilization, innovation, and change (Dubuisson-Quellier 2010; Overdevest 2011).  
Regardless of their different focuses, the two views (and the two corresponding 
lines of research) share the same underlying logic—uncertainties are conceived as 
destabilizing “factors” that, for better or worse, (potentially) bring about disorder, 
disruption, and change. However, this picture of the roles of uncertainties in relation to 
social order is incomplete. This study complements this general picture by showing that 
uncertainties may well increase the stability and robustness of social order (market order 
in this case). This is not in the “risk-aversion” sense that uncertainties deter social actors 
from taking “risky” deviating actions. Rather, uncertainties, conceptualized as some 
shared cognitive “tolerance intervals” of errors and deviations, are akin to lubricant—
12 
 
they make the otherwise brittle and friction-fraught system more robust and error-
tolerant.10
Furthermore, this study provides a novel conceptualization of quality ambiguity—
an important kind of uncertainty that has received much attention from both sociologists 
and economists (e.g., Akerlof, 1970; Lynn, Podolny, and Tao 2009; Peterson 1990; 
Podolny 1993, 1994; Spence 1974; Velthuis 2003). The problem of quality ambiguity is 
usually framed as one of asymmetric information, where, for a given product, there is 
some “true” quality usually known by the seller, but unknown to the buyer. After the 
buyer uses this product for a while, the “true” quality is revealed. However, such a 
framing makes sense only when the standards and procedures for evaluating quality are 
clear and consistent among both buyers and producers. In reality, as is implied by the 
scholarship of marketing research and the perspective of performativity (e.g., Finch 2010; 
Kjellberg and Helgesson 2006; Callon et al. 2002; Callon and Muniesa 2005), there are 
ambiguities and discrepancies intrinsic in the standards, procedures, and processes that 
producers and consumers mobilize to evaluate and compare qualities, individually or 
collectively. Thus, strictly speaking, there is no single “true” quality; rather, there is only 
the “fuzzy” distribution of quality. This “fuzziness” is some irreducible uncertainty that 
confronts both producers and consumers.  
 
In fact, cases in which quality ambiguity is shared by actors on both transaction 
sides have been discussed in sociological studies of particular markets, where the 
                                                             
10 This view of uncertainty is both related to and different from the organizational literature on loose 
coupling (e.g. Orton and Weick 1990; Weick 1976). Markets, the social systems discussed here, may be 
seen as loosely coupled systems in varying degrees. Stability is often associated with loose coupling. 
According to this literature, it is the structural properties of loose coupling that brings about systemic 
stability, while uncertainties are largely treated as some “hostile” environment external to organizations.  In 
contrast, it is argued here that uncertainties, as an integral component of loosely coupled systems, may 
directly contribute to systemic stability. 
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qualities and values of products are less associated with their direct physicality and thus 
are obviously collectively negotiated by market actors, for example, markets for fashion 
(Aspers 2010), arts (Velthuis 2005; Yogev 2010), life insurance (Zelizer 1979), and the 
natural environment (Fourcade 2011). These studies typically focus on how certain social 
mechanisms are invoked to reduce quality/value ambiguity and facilitate the formation of 
a relatively stable and consistent perception of quality/value among market actors. 
However, the current study suggests that even in well-ordered industrial markets of 
standardized products, quality ambiguity persists and affects both producers and buyers. 
Then, what is of theoretical interest is no longer how social mechanisms reduce quality 
ambiguity and impose market order, but rather the role of the persisting quality ambiguity, 
as some non-negligible irreducible uncertainty, in the functioning of the social 




Methodologically (and also substantively, as discussed later on), the current model 
has close connections with the game theoretical model of status formation (Gould 2002; 
Lynn, Podolny, and Tao 2009). Lynn et al. reformulate Gould’s static equilibrium model 
into a dynamic one and incorporate uncertainty into it, just as what the current study does 
to the original W(y) model. However, although the skill sets of the two modeling 
approaches are quite similar, they differ in terms of model assumptions. First, the current 
model (and the original W(y) model) is not a game theoretical one, since it does not share 
the individualistic micro-behavioral assumptions of game theory; instead, its assumptions 
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are clearly more in line with the sociological tradition of social construction, as explained 
in greater detail in chapter 1. Second, while the status formation model adopts the 
economic framework of asymmetric information to approach the issue of quality 
ambiguity, the current model sees quality ambiguity as some irreducible uncertainty faced 
by both sides of transaction. Third, whereas the status formation model includes only one 
kind of uncertainty (quality ambiguity) and treats it as a fixed input, the current model 
considers four different uncertainties and the inter-dynamics among them. 
 
Dissertation Outline 
The rest of this dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 1 provides an informal 
formulation of competition-informed pricing (the price flocking model) and other pricing 
practices. In chapter 2, definitions of relevant market uncertainties—recognitive, 
predictive, absolute, and relative uncertainties—are given, and their direct implications 
for the viability of different pricing practices are laid out in four propositions. In chapter 
3, a formal “flocking model” of competition-informed pricing is formulated. In chapter 4, 
two kinds of dynamic instability of competition-informed pricing—off-equilibrium 
unreliability and vulnerability to disturbance—are demonstrated. It is proved, and 
illustrated by simulation, that all market settings judged inhabitable for competition-
informed pricing by the static W(y) model are subject to the first instability, and some of 
the settings are subject to the second. Thus, under White’s original assumptions, 
competition-informed pricing is infeasible in virtually all market settings due to dynamic 
instability. However, the mechanism does exist in quite some real markets or market 
segments (Chiffoleau and Laporte 2006; Uzzi and Lancaster 2004; White 1981b). To 
15 
 
address this contradiction, in chapter 5, one type of uncertainty—quality ambiguity of 
products—is introduced to the model. It is proved, and illustrated by simulation, that the 
existence of a certain degree of quality ambiguity can greatly reduce both kinds of 
dynamic instability, and thus make competition-informed pricing viable under dynamic 
conditions. In the “Discussion,” the viability conditions for all three pricing practices are 
specified. It turns out that each kind of pricing practice is only viable under certain 
combinations of levels of different market uncertainties. Supporting evidence from 
existing studies, theoretical and practical implications of the current study, as well as 




Chapter 1 An Overview: A Dynamic Formulation of Different Pricing Practices 
 
The problem of elusive market demand faced by firms in an imperfectly competitive 
market is a major concern of this study, which is shared by economics. However, the former, as a 
sociological approach rooted in the theoretical tradition of social construction, differs decisively 
from the latter. The difference lies in their diverging attitudes towards uncertainty. Frank Knight 
(1921) made a famous distinction between calculable risk and irreducible uncertainty. Risk refers 
to the situation in which a probability distribution can be assigned to possible outcomes—a 
version of probabilistic determinism, while in the case of uncertainty, no probabilities can ever 
be sensibly assigned. In most economic models, however, uncertainties are transformed into risks, 
largely because risks are far more mathematically tractable than uncertainties. Accordingly, the 
problem of elusive market demand is usually framed as one of incomplete and/or asymmetric 
information, and bounded rationality. This framing suggests that the market demand (or its 
probability distribution), however elusive, is “out there;” the only problem is the unavailability 
of information, or “data.” Thus, the task for game theorists is to put themselves in the shoes of 
each game player (each firm) and, through cynical speculation on each other’s motives and 
potential actions and/or through certain techniques (signaling, imitation, among many), to reveal 
the existing market demand and/or equilibrium strategies. To begin with, however, game 
theorists still have to assume plenty of information about the demand curve (e.g., Rasmusen 
2001; Ania 2008; Tirole 1988). 
In contrast, the current approach views the problem as one of irreducible uncertainty. 
Therefore, the task of firms is not to discover the existing demand curve(s) (i.e., to get the data), 
because the complete data simply are not out there. Rather, they have to socially construct a 
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demand curve (i.e., to make the data, though by no means from nowhere). This formulation of 
the problem faced by firms is in line with Deweyan pragmatism (Whitford 2002), which would 
proclaim that the unambiguous preferences of buyers (and thus the clear demand curve) do not 
exist before market transactions—i.e., before firms supply their products to the market, set prices, 
and consumers make their purchase decisions. That is, in some sense, the demand curve is not 
something already there but only revealed by market transactions; instead, the demand curve is 
partly brought into being by, and after, the transactions. This suggests there is always at least a 
component of the demand curve that is generated by the firms’ very market actions 
(competitively producing, supplying, advertising, and pricing their products), and cannot be 
determined beforehand. This undetermined component of the demand curve is, obviously, 
irreducible uncertainty, rather than quantifiable risk. 
When this uncertain component of the demand is significant enough, it is nonsensical to 
assume that firms would base their market decisions on the demand curve or on the revelation 
thereof, as there is no meaningful demand curve which can be thought of before firms make their 
market decisions and actions. In such a case, as argued here, the firms would not and cannot 
directly or indirectly speculate on the elusive demand, nor do they have to retreat to the 
stronghold of excessive hierarchies, non-rationalistic imitation, or other “extra-market” 
regulations; rather, they also have the option to collectively construct a shared demand curve by 
monitoring each other’s decisions, actions, and outcomes—this becomes possible and sensible 
given the fact that the market actions of firms give rise to, instead of depending upon or simply 
revealing, the market demand. That is, it is the very existence of uncertainty that makes room for 
the agency of market actors to socially construct and sustain a relatively stable market order, at 
the same time without sacrificing their ability to perform (often “self-interested”) economic 
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calculation and becoming complete “slaves” of culture and institutions. 
 
A Dynamic Formulation of Competition-Informed Pricing: The Price Flocking Model  
Following White, it is assumed that firms are profit-maximizers. Despite its well-known 
limitations, this assumption is analytically attractive. First, it naturally and conveniently leads to 
well-defined equilibrium (or equilibria), if there is (are) any. Second, this assumption, along with 
the resulting equilibrium, provides a baseline for evaluating the actual behaviors of firms.  
However, it has to be emphasized that the firm conceptualized here differs from the 
(bounded) “rational” agent of the economic theory of the firm, who “believes” in the existence of 
an entirely exogenous (though perhaps unrevealed) demand upon which it can “rationally” act. 
Instead, it is more like the Deweyan rational pragmatist whose own market actions would partly 
bring into being the very conditions (the particular market demand) for those actions. In this 
sense, the firm modeled here is an agent combining the characteristics of Deweyan pragmatism 
and the theory of economic performativity, though it is not a pure economic-performative agent, 
as it does not purposefully enforces the law of any specific economic theory based on completely 
exogenous market demand. 
To maximize profit, a firm needs two pieces of information: its revenue curve R(y) and its 
cost curve C(y), where y is the output volume of a certain product (the same y as in White’s 
W(y)), and R(y) and C(y) are the sales revenues and production costs, respectively, 
corresponding to different levels of y. Thus, the expected profit, defined by R(y) - C(y), could be 
maximized by choosing an optimal production volume y*. The associated optimal asking price p* 
is determined by R(y*)/ y*, the expected revenue from selling y* units of product divided by this 
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optimal volume.11 Whereas the cost curve C(y) is supposedly known to the firm itself, the 
revenue curve R(y) is usually unknown, because it is equivalent to the firm’s demand curve,12
This dynamic process has a zoological analogue—the flocking of migratory birds, say, 
wild geese. In a flock of flying geese, each bird constantly adjusts its optimal niche in the 
formation according to (a) the sensed positions of its peers in the air flow (similar to the 
observed sales revenues and volumes of competing firms) and (b) its own strength and maturity 
(analogous to each firm’s cost structure). The aggregated result of this mechanism is some fluid 
curvilinear flock formation (akin to the collectively constructed revenue curve R(y)). Due to this 
analogy, the dynamic model of the W(y) mechanism (or competition-informed pricing) 
constructed here is called the “price flocking model” (or “flocking model” for short). To 
emphasize its dynamic nature, the W(y) mechanism is sometimes called here the “W(y) flocking 
mechanism,” while the term “W(y) model” is reserved exclusively for White’s original static 
version of the W(y) mechanism. 
 
which is elusive due to irreducible uncertainty. To solve this uncertainty problem, instead of 
making extra-assumptions about the demand curves and transforming uncertainties into risks as 
economists usually do, firms, White argues, construct a shared revenue curve by observing each 
other’s realized sales revenues and volumes. This resulting artificial curve, when settling in static 
equilibrium, is the famous W(y) curve. 
                                                             
11 Although this modeling framework adopted by White resembles the economic model of quantity-setting 
competition (the Cournot model) rather than price-setting competition (the Bertrand model), White’s model may be 
seen as both a price-setting and quantity-setting model. Differing from the Cournot (Bertrand) model, in which once 
quantities (prices) are set, prices (quantities) are automatically determined and realized by the force of supply-and-
demand, price and quantity, in White’s view, can be, to some extent, manipulated by firms simultaneously, because 
there are no unambiguous demand curves in the first place. That is, firms can make both pricing and output 
decisions according to the W(y) mechanism without knowing the demand curves. 
   
12 The demand curve describes the relationship between price p and volume y, whereas the revenue curve is about 
the relation between revenue R and volume y. Note that the three variables—p, R, and y—are not independent, since 
R = py. As long as any two of the three are known, the third is known. Thus, the demand curve and the revenue 




The flocking model is summarized in figure 1. Suppose there is a market for a certain 
product, with I competing firms. The product is differentiated among the firms, and these 
variants are, to a considerable extent, mutually substitutive. First, before making a new run (the 
tth run, t = 1, 2, …, T) of output and pricing decisions, each firm i (i = 1, 2, …, I) collects 
information about the realized revenues and volumes of its I-1 competitors in the last run (the (t-
1)th run),13
 
 and then plots these data, along with its own, on the “revenue vs. volume” coordinate 






Max [Rt(y) - C1(y)]










Figure 1: The Flocking Model of Competition-Informed Pricing 
 
Second, each firm uses these observations to fit a regression curve, denoted by Rt(y), with 
                                                             
13 This actually assumes that the realized revenue and volume of each firm are shared information. This assumption 
can be relaxed in some ways. For example, each firm may only collect information about several, rather than all, 
competing firms, and the collected data may be not completely accurate. These relaxations would not change the 
nature of the W(y) mechanism. Moreover, the assumption of synchronized behavior among firms made here is not 
necessary for the W(y) mechanism to hold, but it makes the situation simple and facilitates modeling. However, 
since the pricing and output decisions of firms are modeled here in discrete time, the model does require that firms 
should not adjust their decisions continuously in time. In reality, firms indeed make their decisions in discrete time, 




the volume y being the independent variable and the corresponding sales revenue being the 
dependent variable (different from W(y), Rt(y) is off equilibrium; the subscript t denotes the run 
number). Since the data are the same for all firms, the fitted curve should also be the same, 
presuming all firms use the same regression model.14
Third, each firm i adds below the fitted curve its own cost curve Ci(y), which is assumed 
to be time invariant. (There are nine firms in figure 1, but only three firms’ cost curves are 
plotted.)  
 Then they treat this fitted Rt(y) as their 
shared revenue curve R(y) in the tth run. The rationale for this reasoning is that each firm believes 
that a) the market conditions for the new run would not be too different from those for the last 
run, and b) its product is not too different from those of its competitors, so that it can use its 
competitors’ realized revenue-volume pairs in the last run, along with its own, to approximate its 
own revenue curve in the new run. 
Fourth, the firm i finds the optimal volume, denoted by Yit, by maximizing its expected 
profit Rt(y) - Ci(y) for the tth run, and then calculates the corresponding expected revenue Rit = 
Rt(Yit) (represented by the dots A, B, C, for three firms, respectively, on the fitted curve). The 
initial asking price pit is set as Rit / Yit , equal to the slope of the line from the origin and the dot.  
Fifth, the produced volume Yit is sold in the market with some realized revenue R’it,15 
which is often different from the expected revenue Rit. Then the firms begin the next iteration, 
etc.16
                                                             
14 Of course, the functional form of the fitted Rt(y) curve may vary across firms, but this would not change the nature 
of the mechanism. 
 This process may settle in some equilibrium, in which case the dynamic Rt(y) curve 
 
15 It is assumed throughout that firms do not keep stocks, i.e., in each run firms would adjust the original asked price 
(pit = Rit / Yit) until the entire volume of output is sold out. 
 
16 Firms in reality need not explicitly conduct any of these calculations. They could just perform some coarse 
estimation. Allowing this relaxation is crucial, because otherwise the model lacks the generality to represent the 
loose category of competition-informed pricing. What really matters is: each firm uses the realized outcomes of its 
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becomes the equilibrium W(y) curve. 
It is clear from the description above that the W(y) mechanism is dynamic in nature, but 
the dynamic aspect cannot be captured by the original static W(y) model focusing exclusively on 
equilibrium. As the dynamic aspect comes into sight, an ensuing question is whether the 
equilibria derived by the static model are dynamically stable. Dynamic stability is very crucial 
because the W(y) flocking mechanism, and the corresponding competition-informed pricing, is 
practically infeasible if the equilibria are not dynamically stable—just as a ball cannot stay at the 
peak of a mountain, but can settle down at the bottom of a valley, even though both the peak and 
the bottom represent equilibrium states. 
 
Value-informed and Cost-informed Pricing 
Note that this section is a very coarse description of both value-informed and cost-
informed pricing. What it highlights is the informational aspect, that is, the main kind of 
information the firm bases its pricing decisions on.   
Compared with competition-informed pricing, the models of value-informed pricing and 
cost-informed pricing are much simpler, since both pricing practices are introspective with 
respect to the focal firm and less oriented toward the dynamic interaction among firms, which, in 
fact, also largely frees the two pricing practices from the problem of dynamic (in)stability. (Thus, 
the subscript t for run number is suppressed here in these two models for simplicity.) For value-
informed pricing, the cost structure Ci(y) of firm i is taken for granted by the firm, as in the W(y) 
mechanism. Moreover, it is assumed that a unique and stable revenue curve Ri(y) can also be 
obtained by firm i through certain means, such as assessing the demand for its products by 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    




surveying its potential buyers.17
For cost-informed pricing, the cost structure Ci(y) of firm i is the main information that is 
needed for the firm to make pricing decisions. First, the firm i has a habitual output volume yi 
that is determined by the producer’s experience, rule of thumb, constraints of productive capacity, 
and historical idiosyncrasies and that only needs small adjustment in each run of production. 
Second, the corresponding cost Ci(yi) is obtained. Third, the expected revenue Ri is calculated as 
(1+ρi)Ci(yi), where ρi is some habitual profit rate expected by firm i. At last, the asked price pi is 
set as Ri/ yi. 
 Thus, based on Ci(y) and Ri(y), firm i can conveniently 
determine its optimal output volume yi* and the corresponding optimal asked price pi = Ri(yi*)/ yi*, 
as mentioned above. It is clear that value-informed pricing is the one closest to the pricing 
method prescribed by standard economics, which entails a very strong condition that the demand 
of the firm’s products is very stable and clear so that it can be relatively easily measured by the 
firm from its consumers. If, for example, consumers’ valuation of the firm’s products is very fluid, 
or the demand of its product is easily influenced by the pricing and output decisions of the firm’s 
potential competitors, value-informed pricing would become nonviable, because existing 
methods to directly measure the demand for potential buyers all tend to be very time and 
resource consuming (e.g., Fourcade 2011), even when the measurement is conducted in a one-
shot fashion, let alone in a sustained updating fashion that is required in this case. 
 
Immediate Implications for the Viability of the Three Pricing Practices 
Before proceeding further, the definition of viability of pricing practices needs to be 
clarified first. “Viability” here is conceived as a continuum rather than a “viable vs. nonviable” 
                                                             
17 The demand curve (or the revenue curve) is somehow also equivalent to buyers’ valuation function of the firm’s 




dichotomy. However, such dichotomous language is used here for convenience. For example, 
saying a pricing practice is “nonviable” under certain conditions means that firms tend not to 
adopt this pricing practice, either because following it would be practically infeasible or because 
there are far more efficient alternatives. (Here feasibility is assessed in terms of the implementing 
difficulty and cost of the pricing practice, and efficiency is assessed in terms of the relative 
profit-reaping capacity of the pricing practice compared with other alternatives.) This implies 
that saying a pricing practice is nonviable does not rule out the possibility that, in reality, some 
firm(s) for whatever reasons may use it under those “nonviable” conditions, since it is still 
practically feasible though a bad choice. Similarly, saying a pricing practice is “viable” means 
that it is practically feasible and its efficiency is, at least, not significantly less than other feasible 
alternatives. In a word, viability here is defined in terms of both practical feasibility and 
comparative efficiency.18
Moreover, empirical measures of viability, such as the varying prevalence of different 
pricing practices among the firms under the same market setting, are not usable in the current 
study, because the individual choices of pricing practices made by firms are not directly modeled, 
unlike the case of agent-based modeling. Thus, a composite qualitative criterion of viability is 
needed. Here the most stringent one—the “short board” criterion—is followed, that is, the 
overall viability of a pricing practice is determined by the factor that makes it least viable. 
Therefore, as long as a factor renders a pricing practice nonviable, it is nonviable regardless of 
the value of any other factor. 
 Thus, in a specific market, the three pricing practices might be all 
practically feasible and have their respective actual follower(s), but they have different viabilities, 
some being “viable,” some being “nonviable.”  
                                                             
18 Note that institutional concerns, such as legitimacy and imitation, are not considered here for the purpose of 




Among the three pricing practices, cost-informed pricing clearly requires the least amount 
of information about both demand and competitors, and as obtaining information involves 
(sometimes astronomical) cost, it also bears the least informational cost. Hence, cost-informed 
pricing is practically feasible under almost all circumstances, assuming that firms have clear 
knowledge about their own cost structures. [This does not mean that there is no uncertainty on 
the supply side of the firms; rather, this assumption suggests that, compared with market demand, 
the cost structures of the firms are usually less uncertain. At least, after the goods are produced, 
the costs are largely known—yet this is not the case for market demand and thus pricing.] 
However, cost-informed pricing is not always viable, because under circumstances when either 
of the other two pricing practices is also feasible, it is almost always far less efficient in terms of 
profit-reaping.  
Value-informed pricing, while it requires little information about competitors, requires the 
most amount of information about demand, the obtaining of which is often very costly and even 
not possible at all. Thus, it is only practically feasible under stringent conditions, as discussed 
above. However, in those cases where value-informed pricing is indeed feasible, it is usually the 
most efficient in terms of profit-reaping and thus the most viable.  
In contrast, competition-informed pricing requires little information about demand but 
some about competitors—their pricing and sales results. Although acquiring these results may 
need some effort, it is usually much easier and cheaper than trying to probe the demand of 
potential buyers. Moreover, nowadays these results are routinely published by third-party 
organizations in many well-established markets. Thus, the associated informational cost can be 
treated as minimal, compared with that of value-informed pricing. When practically feasible, the 
profit-reaping capacity of competition-informed pricing is far greater than that of cost-informed 
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pricing, though usually not as great as that of value-informed pricing.19
Three important results are in order. First, as cost-informed pricing is almost always 
practically feasible but the least efficient in terms of profit-reaping, it is viable only when both 
the other two pricing practices are infeasible (as long as either of the other two practices is 
feasible, cost-informed pricing tends to be nonviable, though still feasible). Second, as value-
informed pricing is the most efficient among the three, it tends to be viable as long as it is 
practically feasible. Third, as a logical result, the keystone to a full mapping of the viability 
conditions for all three pricing practices lies in the identification of the feasibility and viability 
conditions for competition-informed pricing. However, such conditions are not that obvious—
this is another important reason why this study chooses competition-informed pricing (and the 
representative W(y) mechanism) as its analytical focus.   
 
                                                             
19 For theoretical and empirical results of the relative profit-reaping capacity/efficiency of pricing practices, see 




Chapter 2 Market Uncertainties and the Viability of Pricing Practices: Four Propositions 
 
Besides its inability to capture market dynamics, another important limitation of the 
original W(y) model is its inability to account for market uncertainties. In White’s theory, 
uncertainty on the demand side only plays the role of a trigger to start the W(y) mechanism. 
Once the mechanism is at work, uncertainty fades into the background and the model looks like a 
deterministic one. However, the elusive demand is only one of many market uncertainties 
troubling market actors, and not all relevant market uncertainties recede after the W(y) 
mechanism is installed. In fact, the W(y) mechanism lives (if viable at all) in an environment 
fraught with uncertainties, and, not surprisingly, its dynamic viability depends on these 
uncertainties and the inter-dynamics among them, as illustrated in later chapters. In this chapter, 
four relevant market uncertainties—recognitive, predictive, absolute, and relative uncertainties—
are defined and their implications for the viability of competition-informed pricing (i.e., the W(y) 
mechanism represented by the price flocking model) and other pricing practices are discussed. 
 
Recognitive Uncertainty 
Recognitive uncertainty is the uncertainty that restricts market actors’ ability to recognize 
certain patterns or regularities, and thus also restricts their confidence in the reliability of the 
recognized patterns or regularities. In the flocking model of competition-informed pricing, high 
recognitive uncertainty refers to the situation in which the realized revenue-volume pairs of all 
firms in the market, when plotted on the coordinate plane, look so random that firms cannot fit a 
meaningful regression curve through them, or have little confidence in the fitted curve if they do 




















(a) (b)  
Figure 2: Low and High Recognitive Uncertainty (Adapted from White 1981b, figure 1) 
 
A possible measure of this recognitive uncertainty (Urc.) is: 
Urc. = 1 - R2,                                                            (1) 
where R2 is the proportion of variance accounted for by the fitted regression model. When firms 
are confronted with high recognitive uncertainty, they cannot fit a meaningful Rt(y) curve, or they 
have little confidence in its reliability, so the W(y) mechanism cannot survive. Similarly, for 
cost-informed pricing, high recognitive uncertainty means firms cannot acquire definite 
knowledge of their own cost structures Ci(y) (such cases should be relatively rare), while for 
value-informed pricing, this means firms cannot obtain a reliable and stable revenue curve Ri(y).   
This leads naturally to proposition 1. 
 
Proposition 1: The feasibility of competition-informed pricing decreases as the 
recognitive uncertainty associated with it increases. Competition-informed pricing is 
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Predictive uncertainty is defined as the uncertainty in the accuracy or correctness of 
predictions made by market actors, which affects the actors’ confidence in the methods used to 
make prediction. For the price flocking model, one kind of predictive uncertainty is the 
uncertainty in the expected revenue Rit (from selling certain volume of product in turn t) 
predicted by each firm i (in turn t-1), which is often different from the realized revenue R’it. Two 
possible measures of this predictive uncertainty of firm i (Uipr.) are: 





−∑ , or                                              (2) 
(# of wrong predictions by firm i) / T,                      (3) 
where measure (2) is the sum of squares of differences between the realized and the expected 
revenues of firm i, from run 1 through run T, divided by T, the total number of runs; measure (3) 
is the number of wrong predictions (i.e. R’it ≠ Rit, or, against some less strict criterion, R’it differs 
from Rit significantly) made by firm i, divided by T, the total number of predictions by firm i—
that is, the proportion of wrong predictions made by firm i. Predictive uncertainty is also 
meaningful at the market level (the collective of firms), denoted by UMpr., which has two 
measures corresponding to those at the firm level:  
                                                             
20 White (1981b) also noted this point, though he did not formalize and elaborate the idea. 
 
21 Note that, in a specific market setting, the fact that the recognitive uncertainty associated with the W(y) 
mechanism (and competition-informed pricing) is high (or low) does not suggest that the recognitive uncertainty 
associated with cost-informed or value-informed pricing is high (or low) too, because the recognitive uncertainty 








=∑ ,                                                   (4) 
depending on which measure is used for calculating Uipr.. For the price flocking model, when 
predictive uncertainty is high, especially if the realized revenues deviate systematically (i.e., the 
observed deviations do not seem random) from the predicted ones, firms have low confidence in 
the method used for prediction, even if they could recognize and fit a sharp Rt(y) curve (i.e., the 
recognitive uncertainty is low). This result (and the measures of predictive uncertainty) also 
applies to the other two pricing practices, with the caveat in mind: as the methods used for 
prediction are different among the three practices, the fact that the predictive uncertainty 
associated with one practice is high (or low) does not imply those associated with the other two 
are high (or low) too. This leads to proposition 2: 
 
Proposition 2: The feasibility of competition-informed pricing decreases as the 
predictive uncertainty associated with it increases. Competition-informed pricing is nonviable 
if predictive uncertainty in the market is too high, especially when the realized outcomes 




Absolute uncertainty refers to the uncertainty surrounding the evaluation of some quantity 
or quality, just as the variance surrounding the mean. One kind of absolute uncertainty that is 
crucial to and shared by all three pricing practices is the ambiguity inherent in buyers and 
consumers’ evaluation of the quality of the products offered by each firm—the absolute quality 
ambiguity. Quality ambiguity (or uncertainty) has long been a key issue in both economics and 
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sociology (e.g., Akerlof, 1970; Lynn et al. 2009; Peterson 1990; Podolny 1993, 1994; Spence 
1974; Velthuis 2003). Most studies approach this issue by first assuming the existence of some 
intrinsic “true” quality level. Then the issue of quality ambiguity is again transformed to that of 
asymmetric information, and the way to deal with it is to invoke some social construct (e.g., 
signals, embedded ties) to channel the needed information and reduce the ambiguity.  
However, the current study conceptualizes ambiguity as some intrinsic property of quality 
(and qualification and valuation in general, see, for example, Aspers and Beckert 2012; Fourcade 
2011; Stark 2009 for similar views)—there is no “true” quality; there is only mean quality and 
the distribution of quality surrounding the mean.22
                                                             
22 It is important to note that, different from the current literature on qualification and valuation which usually 
emphasizes the multi-dimensionality of valuation (that is, speaking of “values” instead of value, and “qualities” 
instead of quality), this study focuses only on a single composite index for the overall valuation of a product, which 
is called “quality.” In other words, “quality” here refers to some generalized quality that subsumes all possible 
dimensions of valuation (including status). However, the purpose for doing so is merely practical: since the buyer 
has to buy, or not to buy, the product as a whole (not just one or several of its many features), he/she has to evaluate 
the product as a whole, including both the relevant physical and non-physical features with status being one of them 
(this view is also implied in Uzzi and Lancaster 2004). Such an overall evaluation of a product, based on which the 
buyer decides to buy or not to buy the product, is the “quality” meant here.  
 Even saying “mean” and “distribution” is 
some approximation to the ambiguous nature of quality, because these two words imply some 
underlying probability distribution, but quality ambiguity is some irreducible uncertainty. If this 
point is admitted, the presumed informational advantage of producers over consumers becomes 
precarious—a producer may have a better idea about the characteristics and features, either 
physical or nonphysical, of his/her product, but he/she does not necessarily have a better idea 
than consumers about what the quality of his/her product is, since the ultimate judge of quality is 
consumers. Therefore, what the producer can do in practice is, on the one hand, to struggle to 
design and produce the product according to the elusive quality standards of consumers, and, on 




own favor (e.g., through advertising).23
Speaking of the producer knowing the “true” quality of its product makes sense only when 
both the producer and consumers reach a complete agreement on the standards for evaluating 
quality—that is, not only do the consumers know exactly what they want, but also the producer 
know exactly what the consumers want. The best approximation in reality of this ideal state is, 
perhaps, an elaborate contract made between a producer and a single customer on a single 
product tailored for this customer. Even in this case, there may still be the problem of 
“incomplete contracts,” a result of irreducible uncertainty and bounded rationality. Most cases in 
reality, even in those markets of highly standardized products (like cars and computers), are 
much worse—the producer does not know exactly what consumers want, and even the 
consumers themselves do not know exactly what they want.  
  
The ambiguity in consumers’ evaluation of quality springs from at least three sources. The 
first is the variation among the supposedly homogeneous products offered by a single firm. Such 
variation does not vanish even under standardized industrial procedures. At first glance, this 
uncertainty seems reducible and may be transformed into risk through statistical methods, such 
as using sampling techniques to quantify the risk of a defective product. However, this is not the 
case, as we will see shortly.  
The second source concerns the way in which each single consumer makes quality 
evaluations. Evaluating quality is some generalized calculation (or qualculation, Cochoy 1998) 
spanning some intermediate range of the cognitive “continuum between qualitative judgment and 
quantitative (or numeric) calculation” (Callon and Muniesa 2005). To get some sense of the 
                                                             
23 Thus, there is no gap existing between the “true” quality of a product and the perceived quality by consumers, 
since there is no “true” quality in the first place; what does exist, however, is the gap between the expected perceived 
quality (distribution) by consumers, from the perspective of the producer when designing and producing the product, 




intermediate nature of this “qualculation,” one need only visit one of the numerous online 
shopping websites to have a glimpse at the “customer reviews and ratings” section. One could 
then discover the (implicit) procedure: for a certain product, consumers tend to first isolate a few 
characteristics and features (both physical and nonphysical) they are most concerned about from 
the totality of the product, assign different weights of importance to them, judge or rate each of 
them respectively, and then give an overall quality rating (usually on a scale from 0 to 5) by 
synthesizing the separate ratings, with varying degree of calculation, elaboration, and patience. 
Evidently, every step of the qualculation process involves ambiguity.24
The third source of quality ambiguity concerns the variation among the quality evaluations 
made by different consumers and the collective nature of making quality evaluations. Naturally, 
different customers tend to give different quality evaluations of the same product, and the 
aggregation of these variations gives rise to the quality ambiguity at the macro-level. However, 
such aggregation is not a simple integration of independently-made individual evaluations; rather, 
this is a collective process involving complex interactions among various market actors and 
devices, for example, producers’ marketing and advertising, retailers’ presentation of the product, 
 From the perspective of 
qualculation, the first source of ambiguity, the variation among supposedly homogenous 
products, involves irreducible uncertainty—it is true that the existence of variation is some 
“objective” fact, but how the variation is viewed and assessed (such as how to define what is a 
defective product) by either the producer or consumers is a matter of qualculation with inherent 
ambiguity. 
                                                             
24 See also Stark (2009) and Favereau et al. (2002). Note that such ambiguity persists even after customers use the 
product (when they are reviewing it), in contrast to the usual framing (asymmetric information) that customers 
reveal the true product quality after purchasing it and uncertainty concerning quality vanishes. The existence of this 
ambiguity is the very reason why every product is subject to qualification and requalification (Callon et al. 2002). 
Whereas Callon et al. (2002, 2005) emphasize the calculability of quality through qualculation, here it is the 




third-party monitoring and rating organizations, and the mutual influence among consumers 
(Callon et al. 2002; Callon and Muniesa 2005; Finch and Geiger 2010). The effect of these 
interactions is to distort—skew, narrow, expand, or shift—the distribution of the otherwise 
independently-made individual evaluations (Gould 2002; Lynn et al. 2009; Salganik et al. 2006). 
The absolute quality ambiguity, in its totality, is the amalgam of all three sources. A 
natural embodiment of this ambiguity is the variation in consumer quality ratings, just as those 
on shopping web sites. Measures for the absolute quality ambiguity of firm i’s product, denoted 
by Uiab., are the variance or standard deviation of quality ratings (assuming there is a “continuous” 
quality rating variable): 
Uiab. = σi2, or σi.                                                            (5) 
Since value-informed pricing, as discussed in the previous chapter, relies on both firms 
and consumers to have clear and consistent valuation of product, it is nonviable if absolute 
quality ambiguity is too high (because high absolute quality ambiguity leads to high recognitive 
uncertainty for value-informed pricing, see proposition 1). However, high absolute quality 
ambiguity would not directly affect the viability of the W(y) mechanism and cost-informed 
pricing, because these depend little on the demand side information. This gives the proposition 
below: 
 
Proposition 3: The feasibility of value-informed pricing decreases as absolute quality 
ambiguity increases. Value-informed pricing is nonviable if absolute quality ambiguity is too 
high. However, this may not be true for competition-informed and cost-informed pricing.25
                                                             
25 Different from recognitive and predictive uncertainties in propositions 1 and 2, in a specific market setting, if 
absolute quality ambiguity is high for one pricing practice, it must be high too for the other two, as it refers to a 







Relative uncertainty refers to the uncertainty in judging the distance or difference between 
two quantities or two qualities. One kind of relative uncertainty that is relevant to all three 
pricing practices is consumers’ ambiguity in judging the difference between the qualities of 
products offered by two firms in the same market—the relative quality ambiguity. On the one 
hand, the existence of relative quality ambiguity relies on the existence of absolute quality 
ambiguity, since if there is no uncertainty about each of the two quality levels, there would be no 
uncertainty about the difference between them. On the other hand, the varying individual quality 
ratings, which constitute the absolute quality ambiguity, cannot be made without comparisons 




that relative, as well as absolute, quality ambiguity is faced by both the producer and consumers. 
 
Figure 3: The Absolute and Relative Uncertainties 
                                                             
26 The dialectics of the absolute and relative quality ambiguities echoes those of “differentiation vs. similitude,” or 
“disentanglement vs. entanglement,” (Callon and Muniesa 2005; Finch and Geiger 2010). However, here it is the 
uncertainty/ambiguity, rather than calculability, that is emphasized. 
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(Notes: (a) high absolute and high relative uncertainty; (b) high absolute and low relative 
uncertainty; (c) low absolute and high relative uncertainty; (d) low absolute and low relative 
uncertainty) 
   
    High absolute uncertainty does not necessarily imply high relative uncertainty, because 
the latter also depends on the distance between the two distributions. Figure 3 illustrates the 
relationship between the two ambiguities. A measure of the relative quality ambiguity between 
the products offered by two firms i and j, denoted by Uijrl., is: 






,                                                             (6) 
where σi and σj denote the standard deviations of quality ratings for the products offered by firms 
i and j respectively, and µi and µj denote the mean ratings for the two firms’ products. It is clear 
that the greater the absolute quality ambiguities and the smaller the distance between mean 
qualities, the higher the relative quality ambiguity. In other words, two quality distributions 
overlapping too much make it difficult to discern the difference between the two distributions. 
Relative quality ambiguity is important to production markets. The ideas of “monopolistic 
competition” (Chamberlin 1962), “economy of qualities” (Callon et al. 2002), and the W(y) 
mechanism are all based on the singularity and comparability of products established through 
differentiation among competing firms. However, high relative quality ambiguity obscures the 
differences of qualities among products of different firms, and thus undermines the very logic of 
differentiation. If the relative quality ambiguity in a market is so high that consumers are unable 
to distinguish between products in terms of quality, then the market would verge on the situation 
of “pure competition” (Chamberlin 1962). In such a case, all pricing practices based on product 
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differentiation are nonviable, including both the W(y) mechanism and value-informed pricing,27
 
 
but cost-informed pricing would still be viable, since it mainly relies on a firm’s own cost 
information with little ambiguity. This leads to the following proposition: 
Proposition 4: The feasibility of competition-informed pricing decreases as relative 
quality ambiguity increases. Competition-informed pricing is nonviable if relative quality 
ambiguity is too high. This is also true for value-informed pricing, but not true for cost-
informed pricing. 
 
The four propositions in this chapter serve only as a partial guide for further investigating 
the viability conditions of the three pricing practices. As discussed in the previous chapter, the 
keystone to a full mapping of the viability conditions of all three pricing practices lies in the 
specification of the feasibility/viability conditions of competition-informed pricing. However, what 
is crucial, but missing from these propositions, is the inter-dynamics among the four kinds of 
market uncertainties. The four uncertainties are not mutually independent if the flocking model is 
at work: as shown in later chapters, varying the size of the absolute quality ambiguity would 
cause the sizes of the other three uncertainties to change in different directions, through the 
dynamics of the W(y) mechanism in a given market. In the following chapters, the size of the 
                                                             
27 The W(y) mechanism relies on product differentiation because if there is no differentiation in terms of quality, the 
situation would become similar to that of “pure competition” (Chamberlin 1962). In other words, it is similar to one 
of oligopolistic competition with no product differentiation, in which, due to the pressure of “pure competition,” the 
profit of the firm would be driven down toward zero, or equivalently, its revenue would be driven down toward cost. 
Thus, in pure competition, paradoxically, information of cost, rather than information of competitors, would become 
predominantly important. As a result, cost-informed pricing, rather than competition-informed pricing, would 
prevail (see also Tirole 1988). Value-informed pricing is based on the “unique” value of the product (compared with 
products offered by other firms) perceived by consumers, which, of course, also depends on quality differentiation. 
If relative quality ambiguity is high, the quality differentiation is obscured. This means that the demand of the focal 
firm’s products can be easily influenced by its competitors’ pricing/output decisions, which makes the demand 
elusive and, as a result, leads to high recognitive uncertainty. According to proposition 1, high recognitive 




absolute quality ambiguity is treated as the only independent variable and the other three 
uncertainties are treated as intermediate variables. By varying the size of the independent 
variable, the resulting changes in the intermediate variables can be investigated, so that the final 
outcome—the feasibility/viability conditions of the W(y) flocking mechanism—can be derived 
with the assistance of the four propositions. 
A remaining technical question is how to mathematically model uncertainty. The approach 
adopted here is to use probability distributions to approximate the properties of uncertainty, since 
the techniques dealing with probabilities are well-developed and easy to understand. Although 
this approach involves probabilistic modeling, it does not convert the issue of uncertainty into 
one of risk, because all of the parameters and information concerning the assumed probabilistic 
distributions are “concealed” from the main market actors—the competing firms—and cannot be 
used in their decision making.  
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Chapter 3 A Formal Flocking Model of Competition-Informed Pricing 
 
In order to investigate the dynamics among different market uncertainties (defined and 
discussed in the previous chapter) and the dynamic feasibility/vaibility of competition-informed 
pricing, a formal price flocking model, based on White’s static model, is developed in this 
chapter. There are two major improvements. First, the four kinds of market uncertainties, largely 
ignored in the static model, are explicitly modeled and brought into focus. Second, to examine 
the dynamics leading markets into or out of equilibrium, the W(y) flocking mechanism is 
modeled as a Markov-like iterative process. That is, it is assumed that firms base pricing and 
output decisions in iteration t only on market information in the last iteration t-1, while ignoring 
information in earlier iterations (1, 2, …, t-2). Adopting the Markov-like assumption does not 
mean that it is the only or best way to model the W(y) dynamics—other modeling alternatives 
incorporating information of earlier iterations are readily at hand (e.g., some version of Bayesian 
updating). However, there are several reasons for choosing the Markov-like model. It is 
technically simple and easy to understand. As long as it is sufficient to describe the major aspects 
of the phenomenon, a simpler model is always preferred. Moreover, it is consistent with the spirit 
of the original W(y) model. Under the irreducible uncertainty of elusive demand, market 
information in the past quickly becomes outdated and useless, and the Markov-like assumption 
captures this situation. Third, examining the conditions under which the Markov-like assumption 
becomes unacceptable could provide some assistance in looking for the (in)feasibility conditions 
of the W(y) flocking mechanism.  
One more caveat: in later chapters the variable price may sometimes seem to be missing 




Absolute and Relative Quality Ambiguities 
Now consider a market of a certain product consisting of I competing firms. Each firm i (i 
= 1, 2, …, I) produces the product with some quality distribution Ni (Ni can also be interpreted as 
a random variable). Figure 4 illustrates the quality distributions for all firms. Suppose Ni follows 
a normal distribution with mean ni and standard deviation σ, where ni > 0, and σ << ni (so that the 
probability of getting a negative quality rating is almost zero),28
Uiab. = Uab. = σ, for all i.                                                  (7) 
 and n1 < n2 < …< nI. That is, to 
make things simple, the absolute quality ambiguity Uiab. (see equation 5) is assumed to be equal 









n1-2σ n1+2σ  
Figure 4: Quality Distributions of All Firms 
 
Note that in the original W(y) model (White 1981a, b), each firm’s product has an 
                                                             
28 The reason for making this stipulation is that the original W(y) model restricts the range of quality n to [0, +∞], so 
letting σ << ni could make the current model practically consistent with the original one. A more mathematically 
appealing approach is to assume Ni follows a Log-normal or Gamma distribution, but the normal distribution is 
practically simpler. Simulations have also been run under the Log-normal and Gamma assumptions, which show no 




unambiguous quality level ni, which differs from the current model. For ease of exposition, it is 
further assumed that the mean qualities of all firms are evenly spaced with the same distance Δn, 
i.e., ni - ni-1 = Δn (for i = 2, 3, …, I), so that the relative quality ambiguity between any two firms 
with neighboring mean qualities, according to equation (6), is the same: 
Ui(i-1)rl. = ( )1
1
2i i






, for i = 2, 3, …, I.                              (8) 
The assumptions of uniform absolute and relative quality ambiguities can easily be 
relaxed. However, doing so would not change the nature of the model, only make it more 
complex. 
Consumers have some sense of the means and dispersions of the quality distributions, 
gained from their own experiences and observation of each other’s judgments and ratings. Thus, 
if a representative consumer sees a particular quality rating of a firm’s product too far away 
(either too high or too low) from the average rating, he/she would discard the rating as abnormal. 
This suggests that consumers have some sense of the “normal range” of each firm’s product 
quality, which can be modeled by truncating the two tails of the normal distribution. In the 
current model, such “normal range” (N.R. for short) is set as:  
N.R. = (ni -2σ, ni +2σ),                                               (9) 
that is, about 95% of all ratings of the firm’s product would be included in this interval as 
“normal” ratings. In other words, typical consumers believe that the reasonable quality of the 
firm’s product would not fall out of this interval; therefore, this interval may also be interpreted 
as the confidence interval for the firm’s product quality. Of course, this somewhat arbitrary 
interval can be set with other sizes, but doing so would not make any qualitative difference. 
 
Consumers’ Valuation Functions 
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Consumers’ valuation of a firm’s total output (not just the evaluation of its quality) is 
defined as the amount of money consumers, in aggregate, are willing to pay for buying the entire 
volume of the firm’s output. Such valuation, denoted by V, depends on two independent 
variables: the volume of the firm’s output y and the quality of its product Ni. The larger the 
volume and the higher the quality, the more money consumers in aggregate are willing to pay for 
the volume. Adapting from White (1981b, p.521, eq. 2, and p. 525, eq. 4), the valuation function 





,   with r, a, b > 0, θ ≥ 1, and Ni ∈(ni -2σ, ni +2σ),            (10) 
where r is a positive scalar, a and b determine the sensitivity of consumers’ valuation to changes 
in volume and quality, respectively, θ represents the “discount” consumers uniformly impose on 
all firms (since consumers usually do not want to pay in full for the value of the product),29
The valuation function (10) has a linear equivalent. Notice that all three variables V, y and 
Ni are positive real numbers. Thus, a natural transformation (as in regression analysis) is the log 
transformation. Taking the logarithm of both sides of equation (10) leads to: 
 and 
Ni is a random variable within the “normal range” of firm i’s product quality, following the 
normal distribution with mean ni and standard deviation σ (but its two tails are cut off). 
log V(y; Ni) = log log log( )i
ra y b N
θ
+ + .                                          (11) 
                                                             
29 The “discount” parameter θ may be time-varying. For run t, the “discount” (now denoted by θt) can be modeled as 
θt = max {θ1t, θ2t, …, θIt}, where θit = 
a b
it iry n /Rit, for i =1, 2, …, I. The numerator of the fraction is the “undiscounted” 
(average) value of firm i’s product with volume yit (see eq. 10), and the denominator Rit is the total price the firm 
asks for this volume. Thus, θit represents the “discount” offered by firm i, and consumers choose the greatest 
“discount” from all θit’s to impose uniformly on all firms, which becomes θt. In this way, the price competition 
among firms is captured. However, as made clear later, the current model focuses on near-equilibrium dynamics, so 
θt is fixed at its equilibrium value θ (to be set as a simulation parameter) for the sake of simplicity. That is, it is 
assumed that the dispersion among all the “discounts” offered by firms is small enough (relative to relative quality 
ambiguity) so that consumers do not take seriously the differences among the “discounts.” This assumption is also in 




That is, log V is a simple linear combination of log y and log Ni. Other model 
specifications are also possible, but the main results are robust (White 1981a). 
A salient difference between eq. (10) and White’s valuation function (1981b, p.521, eq. 2) 
is that the latter has an unambiguous quality n, while the current function has a random variable 
Ni representing the absolute quality ambiguity.30
 
 A result of introducing this ambiguity is that the 
originally sharp valuation curves now becomes “fuzzy” valuation bands. The “central” (modal, 
actually) line of each band is V(y, ni), and the two boundaries of the band are defined by V(y; 
ni+2σ) and V(y; ni -2σ). As σ decreases to zero, the bands collapse into White’s valuation curves 























Figure 5: Consumers’ Valuation Bands 
                                                             
30 Another difference is that eq. (10) introduces the “discount” θ into the valuation function. However, this is not a 
real difference, since eq. (10) can be seen as a combination of White’s two functions (1981b, p.521, eq. 2, and p. 525, 





Now suppose the firm with quality distribution N3 makes an offer to sell volume y1 at price 
p1, represented by point 1 in figure 5. Consumers will not accept this offer, because it falls 
outside the valuation band. Since point 1 is above the band, consumers would think that the unit 
price p1 (the slope of the line linking the origin and point 1) set by the firm is too high for the 
“normal range” of its product quality. It is stipulated here that, in such a case, consumers would 
pay the amount corresponding to the mean quality, i.e., V(y1; n3), for the volume y1.31
It must be emphasized that the valuation function is only a quantitative approximation of 
the consumer’s behavior. In reality, consumers do not know the value of any model parameters; 
they do not even know the value of the mean quality and the standard deviation, let alone the 
specific “normal range” of the quality. However, consumers do have some sense of the average 
quality and its dispersion, and they do calculate—they perform generalized calculation, or 
qualculation (Callon and Muniesa 2005). The valuation function (10) is aimed at quantitatively 
 The 
realized transaction is represented by point 4. If the firm’s offer is point 2, consumers would 
accept that offer, because it falls within the valuation band, suggesting that the unit price p2 
matches the “normal range” of its quality. If the firm’s offer is point 3, consumers would 
perceive that the unit price p3 is too low for the normal range of its quality. Of course, consumers 
would not pay more than that offered by the firm, but the firm would soon discern the unusually 
high demand from consumers, and raise the unit price to increase profit. It is again assumed that 
the realized payment by consumers is that corresponding to the mean quality, i.e., V(y3; n3), 
represented by point 5. 
                                                             
31 Of course, there are alternatives to this stipulation. For example, it could be assumed that consumers pay the 
amount corresponding to the boundary quality (either the lower or upper bound). Or, the consumers could pay some 
random amount distributed between the lower and the upper bounds. However, these alternatives would not change 




capturing and describing the major properties of this qualculation process through introducing 
the absolute quality ambiguity σ as a model parameter: in market settings with small σ, 
consumers’ qualculation behavior is closer to quantitative calculation, while in settings with large 
σ, consumers’ qualculation verges on qualitative judgment. 
Naturally, it is even harder for firms to assess consumers’ valuation functions—that is the 
irreducible uncertainty in the elusive demand of consumers. If they could, they would be able to 
implement the most favorable value-informed pricing, since they would know exactly how 
consumers valuate their products. This scenario, as is shown in later chapters, is not impossible.   
 
Firms’ Cost Curves 
Following White (1981b, p. 521, eq. 1), the cost curve/function for firm i is specified as: 
C(y; ni) = /c diqy n , with q, c > 0,                                            (12) 
where q is simply a positive scalar; c, d determine the sensitivity of the firm’s cost to changes in 
volume y and mean quality ni, respectively. Different from White’s original cost function where n 
stands for an unambiguous quality level, here ni stands for the mean of the quality distribution Ni.   
Also note that, in contrast to the consumers’ valuation function (10), there is no random 
term in the cost function. The reason is there is far less ambiguity in firms’ cost structure than in 
consumers’ valuation. In practice, each firm i, supposedly, should be clear about its costs 
corresponding to various volumes of output. Thus, the firm could easily fit a cost curve in some 
functional form, such as 
Ci(y) = iciA y ,                                                             (13) 
where Ai and ci are the only two regression parameters to be estimated. The firm need not know 
anything else. The cost function (12) is specified from the perspective of a researcher, who wants 
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to find a common structure for the cost curves of all firms in the market—a matter irrelevant for 
individual firms. If the researcher’s model specification is good enough, as is assumed hereafter, 
he/she would have 
 Ai = q/nid and ci = c, for all i,                                           (14) 
which can be easily derived by comparing eqs. 12 and 13. 
It is assumed that the cost curves are private information, that is, each firm only knows its 
own cost structure but has no accurate information about those of the others. 
 
Fitting the Revenue Curve and Measuring Recognitive Uncertainty 
The foregoing model specifications (eqs. 7 to 14) are all assumed to be time-invariant, 
including the quality distribution of each firm’s product, consumers’ valuation structure for each 
firm’s product, and each firm’s cost structure. From now on, the modeling proceeds to the 
dynamic stage.  
    Now suppose the I firms in the market are about to make pricing and output decisions 
for the tth run (t = 1, 2, …, T) of production. It is assumed here that the flocking model has 
already been at work, so all firms follow its rule. Since each firm i has obtained its cost curve (eq. 
13 with ci = c and Ai = q/nid), the other piece of information the firm needs is the collectively 
constructed revenue curve for the tth run—Rt(y). Thus, under the Markov-like assumption, each 
firm plots the realized sales revenues and volumes of all firms in the (t-1)th run, denoted by '( 1)i tw −  
and '( 1)i ty −  (i = 1, 2, …, I)—on the coordinate plane, and fits a curve through them with the 
functional form: 
Rt(y) = 10 tBtB y , or in linear form:                                         (15) 
log Rt(y) = ( )1 0log logt tB y B+ ,                                           (16) 
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where B0t and B1t are the two regression coefficients to be estimated, and the subscript t suggests 
that they vary across time.32
 
 A measure of the involved recognitive uncertainty Urc can be 
obtained with eq. 16 by computing the corresponding 1 – R2 (see eq. 1). 
Making Output and Pricing Decisions 
With the fitted revenue curve Rt(y) and the cost curve Ci(y) at hand, each firm can now 
calculate the optimal output volume yit*, and the corresponding expected revenue Rt(yit*), and the 
corresponding unit price pit = Rt(yit*) / yit* that maximizes the expected profit Rt(y) - Ci(y). To find 
the optimal volume yit*, each firm i could use the equation below derived from the first order 
condition for maxima: 
[ ] ( )1 1 1 10 0 1( ) ( ) 0t i t iB c B ct i t i t t i id dR y C y B y A y B B y Ac ydy dy
− −− = − = − = ,             (17) 
where the first equation follows directly from eqs. 13 and 15; B0t , B1t , Ai , and ci are all 
regression coefficients estimated by the firm, but, as mentioned before, the researcher knows that 
Ai = q/nid and ci = c (eq. 14). Since it is assumed that the W(y) flocking mechanism has been at 
work, one need not worry about the second order condition; in fact, the current market is 
assumed to satisfy all the static viability conditions derived by White, that is, this market falls 
within one of the three viable regions in White’s market parameter plane (1981b, p. 527, fig. 3). 
Thus, the optimal volume yit* can be obtained by solving equation 17 for y, and substituting in 
equation 14, giving: 
yit* =
( ) ( )1 11/ 1/
0 1 0 1
t i tB c B c
i i
d
t t t t i
Ac qc
B B B B n
− −
   
=   
   
.                                     (18) 
                                                             
32 Eqs. 15 and 16 are actually equivalent to the functional form of the W(y) curve derived by White (1981b, p.525, 





One could then obtain the corresponding Rt(yit*) and pit .33
In order to model the various random errors involved in the actual process of data 
collection and calculation performed by the firms, and their possible (random) tendencies to 
deviate from the profit-maximization norm, now assume that the final calculated “optimal” 
volume, denoted by Yit, and the corresponding expected revenue, denoted by Rit, are in general 
different from the true optima yit* and Rt(yit*): 
 
Yit = yit* + εit ,                                                              (19) 
Rit = Rt(yit*) + δit ,                                                        (20) 
where εit is some random error normally distributed with mean 0 and standard deviation 0.05yit*, 
and δit is also some normally distributed error with mean 0 and standard deviation 0.05Rt(yit*). 
That is, with about a 0.95 chance, the final decisions of output volume and expected revenue 
would deviate from the true optimal values no more than 10%. It is further assumed that the error 
terms are all independent, for all i and t. 
  
Realized Market Outcomes and Predictive Uncertainty 
Now each firm i makes an offer to consumers, asking Rit dollars for the produced volume 
Yit , with unit price pit = Rit /Yit . Let y’it and R’it be the final realized volume and revenue, 
respectively. Under the assumption that firms do not keep stocks, one has y’it  = Yit. However, the 
value of R’it depends on whether the offer (Yit, Rit) falls within consumers’ valuation band (see 
figure 5). If the offer falls in the valuation band, one has R’it = Rit ; otherwise, R’it = V(Yit; ni) (see 
eq. 10 and figure 5). Now the firms finish the tth run, and then proceed to the (t+1)th run, so on so 
                                                             
33 It must be noted that firms need not explicitly perform these calculations. For example, as Leifer (1985) points out, 
what the firm needs is a pen, a ruler, and a piece of paper to draw the curves and then use the ruler to find the 




forth. The associated predictive uncertainty can be measured by eqs. (2), (3), or (4). 
The flocking model of competition-informed pricing not only captures the dynamics and 
various market uncertainties, but also takes into account firms’ behaviors that deviate from the 
profit-maximization paradigm. It can be proved that the static W(y) model is a special case of the 
current model, with the absolute quality ambiguity σ and disturbances (εit’s and δit’s) all set to 
zero, and Yit =Yi(t-1) for all i and for at least one t ∈{1, 2, …}.34
However, in the next chapter, the situation under investigation is: there is no quality 
ambiguity, but there are disturbances (i.e., εit’s and δit’s are not zeros). Then the dynamic stability 
of the flocking model is studied. As one will see, the mechanism is unstable, and thus practically 
infeasible (and nonviable). 
 That is, given there is no quality 
ambiguity, and no disturbances, as long as the W(y) flocking mechanism steps into equilibrium 
once, it will be locked in forever, and the fluctuant Rt(y) curve rigidifies into the static W(y) 
curve.  
                                                             
34 Note that the current model is still a simplified version of the W(y) mechanism, since the market saturation 
parameter γ and the “exploitation” ratio τ (White 1981a, b, 2002) are not included. A major function of these two 
parameters is to determine the equilibrium “discount” parameter θ. Because θ is included in the model, the effects of 
γ and τ are also partly taken into account. A more sophisticated dynamic model which includes the two parameters 
has also been developed, and simulations show that the results presented in this paper, which are obtained from the 
current model, can also be replicated from the more complex model. Thus, the current model suffices for the 




Chapter 4 Dynamic Instability 
 
Throughout this chapter, the absolute quality ambiguity σ, as is in the original W(y) model, 
is assumed to be zero; as a result, the relative quality ambiguity is also zero (see eq. 8). However, 
disturbances (the error terms, εit’s and δit’s, in eqs. 19 and 20) are kept in the model. Thus, here 
the task is, in the absence of quality ambiguity, to examine the dynamic robustness of the 
flocking model to these disturbances ubiquitous in markets, with the guidance of propositions 1 
and 2. 
    In this chapter, it is shown that the W(y) mechanism is subject to two kinds of dynamic 
instability—the off-equilibrium unreliability and vulnerability to disturbance. To better illustrate 
these two concepts, two numerical simulations under corresponding market settings are first 
provided, then followed by theoretical explanations. Note that all the simulations in this 
dissertation assume that at time t = 0 the W(y) mechanism is in equilibrium, only in subsequent 
iterations do disturbances keep pulling it away from equilibrium. That is, this study only 
investigates the near-equilibrium behavior of the W(y) flocking mechanism, to see, after the 
mechanism is pulled off equilibrium, if it will stably fluctuate around the equilibrium or further 
slide away from the equilibrium towards breaking down. 
 
Off-equilibrium Unreliability 
A necessary condition for the flocking model to survive is that the fitted revenue curves 
Rt(y) must provide reasonably good predictions, for the firms, of the sales revenues 
corresponding to various levels of output, since this is exactly what the name “revenue curve” 
suggests. In other words, the predictive uncertainty of the Rt(y) curves cannot be too high 
51 
 
(proposition 2); otherwise, the firms would lose their confidence in its reliability as their revenue 
curve. If the W(y) flocking mechanism is in equilibrium, there is no such problem, because the 
W(y) curve (the Rt(y) curve in equilibrium) would provide perfect prediction of the firms’ sales 
revenues, and thus the W(y) curve itself would be perfectly reproduced by the realized 
outcomes—this follows from the very definition of equilibrium. However, once the W(y) 
mechanism is perturbed by disturbances and leaves equilibrium, firms have to face the problem 
of predictive uncertainty. In such a case, as it turns out, firms would find that the realized sales 
revenues tend to deviate systematically from those predicted by the Rt(y) curves, and thus deem 
the curves unreliable. This off-equilibrium unreliability of the W(y) flocking mechanism is 
illustrated by the following simulation. 
 
Table 1: Simulation Setting 1 
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Consider a market setting adapted from the U.S. cement market in White (1981b, p. 
530).35
                                                             
35 The cement market is in the “grind” region, one of the three viable regions for the W(y) mechanism specified in 
White 1981b, p. 527, fig. 3. The other two regions are named “crowded” and “paradox.” 
 The market parameters used in the simulation are listed in table 1. The simulation settings 
in this dissertation are all based on the examples in White (1981a, b), all satisfying the static 
viability conditions he specified. For all the simulation parameter settings, there are three places 
different from White’s parameters: first, the value of the scalar r in consumers’ valuation 




The main purpose of making these changes is to let the ranges of data across different simulation 
settings become more comparable, facilitating comparison and graphic presentation. Note that, 
according to White’s theory, these changes would not affect the viability properties of the W(y) 
mechanism.  
The number of firms in the market is set to nine for all simulations. This somewhat 
arbitrary number results from the trade-off between two considerations. On the one hand, if there 
are too few firms in the market, there would not be enough data points to reasonably assume all 
firms fit the curve with the same specific functional form.36
The initial state of the simulation at time t = 0, as mentioned before, is the equilibrium 
state, so the initial sales revenue and volume of each firm can be easily obtained from the static 
W(y) curve (White 1981a, p. 20, eq. 15, with K set to zero). Fifty iterations are run in the 
simulation, i.e., t = 1, 2, …, 50. The simulation results are shown in figure 6. The 
expected/predicted sales revenue-volume pairs (the X’s) and realized pairs (the dots) of three 
firms (with respective qualities n1, n2, n3), along with the static W(y) curve, are plotted.  
 On the other hand, if there are too 
many firms in the market, it is unreasonable to assume each firm will treat all the other firms as 
its immediate competitors and keep tracking the information on all of them.       
It can be seen from figure 6 that, under the condition of no quality ambiguity, the realized 
outcomes deviate systematically from the predicted ones. In fact, the realized outcomes reveal a 
unique revenue curve, embodied by the dots, for each firm. These revealed revenue curves, 
differing from both the W(y) and Rt(y) curves, turn out to be the consumers’ valuation function 
V(y; ni) (eq. 10). The predictive uncertainty of the W(y) mechanism, measured with eqs. 3 and 4, 
                                                             
36 In fact, the W(y) mechanism can exist in a market with as few as three firms. Even if the firms use different 
functional form to fit the curve, this would only add more disturbances to the dynamics but not change the nature of 
the mechanism. So here the consideration of the number of firms is only for the purpose of making the assumptions 




is 1. That is, no firm at all ever makes a single correct prediction using the W(y) mechanism. 
More importantly, as long as the firm keeps record of its realized outcomes in each run, it would 
discover the systematic deviation and find its real revenue curve embodied by the dots. In this 
case, the Markov-like assumption becomes unreasonable, because the realized outcomes reveal 
such strong regularity that it is hard to imagine firms would continue to behave as if they are 




Figure 6: Off-equilibrium Unreliability of the Flocking Model (the W(y) Flocking Mechanism) 
 
It can be further shown (but not shown here) that this problem of off-equilibrium 
unreliability prevails in all market parameter settings judged inhabitable for the W(y) 
mechanism by White’s static model, that is, all three viable regions in White’s topology (White 
1981b, p. 527, fig. 3). The cause for the off-equilibrium unreliability of the W(y) mechanism is 
the low absolute quality ambiguity. Low absolute quality ambiguity suggests that the demand of 

























consumers is no longer that elusive—at least, it can be partly revealed by the firms through 
repeated trials. In such a case, firms do not need to collectively construct some approximated 
revenue curve, since they have a more accurate alternative—the revealed ones. Then, they could 
perform profit-maximizing calculation based on these revealed revenue curves, and this scheme 
is the very essence of value-informed pricing and monopolistic competition. When the absolute 
(and relative) quality ambiguity is low, the products offered by competing firms are almost 
perfectly differentiated, and the consumers’ demand is also almost perfectly segmented, so that 
the firm can relatively easily estimate its revenue curves through probing the unambiguous 
valuation of its product made by its segment of consumers. This leads to the two conclusions 
below:  
 
Conclusion 1: value-informed pricing is feasible and most efficient, and thus viable, if 
the absolute quality ambiguity in the market is very low (i.e., σ is close to zero). 
 
Conclusion 2: If the absolute quality ambiguity in the market is very low (i.e., σ is close 
to zero), competition-informed pricing is unreliable in prediction (high predictive uncertianty) 
and much less efficient than value-informed pricing, and thus nonviable. 
 
    If all firms in the market are performing value-informed pricing, a new (equilibrium) 
market profile, called here the R(y) curve, may result, and this R(y) curve is very similar to the 
W(y) curve in terms of shape and functional form (see the detailed derivation of the R(y) curve 
in appendix A). Thus, cross-sectional market data, as those used in White (1981b), are not 
sufficient to distinguish the W(y) mechanism from the R(y) mechanism in empirical markets. 
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This implies that at least some empirical markets identified by White (1981b) as following the 
W(y) mechanism may actually perform value-informed pricing.  
 
Vulnerability to Disturbance 
In theory, the existence of off-equilibrium unreliability cannot completely rule out the 
existence of competition-informed pricing, because according to conclusion 2 it may still be 
feasible (though nonviable). Although unlikely, it could be the case that at some earlier 
development stage of the market, when the quality ambiguity of products was not that low, firms 
followed the flocking model; however, at a later stage, the quality ambiguity, for whatever reason, 
becomes low enough for the off-equilibrium unreliability to grow significantly, but, because the 
firms have been used to the flocking model, they may continue to follow it. Or, it could be the 
case that the flocking model simply becomes some norm, either tacit or institutionalized, among 
the firms to coordinate competition and maintain the hierarchy of the market.  
However, there is a second kind of dynamic instability, which is more fundamental than 
off-equilibrium unreliability, inherent in the W(y) mechanism—the vulnerability to disturbance. 
That is, even if the firms in a market are “blind” to the off-equilibrium unreliability and stick to 
the W(y) mechanism, the mechanism may still not be viable due to this vulnerability. To better 
understand the vulnerability to disturbance, recall the metaphor mentioned before: both the peak 
of a mountain and the bottom of a valley represent some equilibrium states, but a ball at the peak 
will roll down the slope when disturbed and cannot go back again by itself, while the ball at the 
bottom of the valley when disturbed can return to the bottom by itself under the force of gravity. 
Thus, the equilibrium represented by the peak is vulnerable to disturbance, whereas the one 
represented by the valley bottom is robust to disturbance. It can be shown that the equilibria in 
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some market settings of the W(y) mechanism are the “valley bottom,” while in other settings the 
equilibia are the “mountain peak.” 
Simulation setting one above (with no quality ambiguity) turns out to be a “valley bottom” 
and thus robust to disturbance. To illustrate this, figure 7 plots the simulation trajectories of the 
two estimated regression coefficients, B0t and B1t , of the fitted Rt(y) curves across time. The two 
coefficients oscillate quite stably around their equilibrium values (the horizontal lines), in spite 
of persisting disturbances. This suggests that the Rt(y) curve fluctuates stably around the 
equilibrium W(y) curve. Moreover, it can be further shown that if there are only some one-time 
disturbance at t = 1, that is, all the error terms, εit’s and δit’s, are set to zero for t > 1, the W(y) 
flocking mechanism can go back (converge) to equilibrium after some time, which is a more 
direct piece of evidence for its stability. This is illustrated in figure 8. 
 
Figure 7: Trajectories of regression coefficients of Rt(y) with persisting disturbances (Setting 1) 




















Figure 8: Trajectories of regression coefficients of Rt(y) with one-time disturbances (Setting 1) 
 
However, the two following settings (settings 2 and 3, without quality ambiguity) are the 
“mountain peak,” and thus vulnerable to disturbance. The values of model parameters for these 
two settings are listed in table 2.37
  
 Note that both these settings are judged inhabitable for the 
W(y) mechanism by White. Again, it is assumed that firms totally ignore the problem of off-
equilibrium unreliability and stick to the W(y) mechanism. 
Table 2: Simulation Settings 2 and 3:  
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37 Setting 2 is adapted from the example for “crowded” markets in White (1981a, p. 35), while setting 3 is from the 
one for “paradox” markets in White (1981a, p. 25). 
 





















For setting 2, the simulation trajectories of the two regression coefficients (B0t and B1t ), 
together with their equilibrium values (the horizontal lines), are plotted in figures 9 and 10. 
Likewise, the simulation results for setting 3 are plotted in figure 11 (the plots are truncated 
earlier than t=100 in order to see the start of divergence). It turns out that in both settings both 
persisting and one-time disturbances generate the same kind of trajectories of the regression 
coefficients, so there is only one figure plotted for both kinds of disturbances. 
In setting 2, figure 9 shows that the coefficient B0t quickly falls to zero and B1t turns 
negative, in which case the Rt(y) curve “collapses” into a horizontal line with zero “height” (see 
eq. 15) . This suggests that firms would gain zero revenue no matter how large/small their output 
volumes are. Actually, in this setting, it is equally possible that B0t drastically increase to plus 
infinity and B1t also increases (see figure 10). In such a case, the Rt(y) curve “explodes,” 
suggesting the revenues of firms could increase unboundedly. Whether the curve collapses or 
explodes depends on the direction of the initial disturbances, just like the direction of the initial 
tiny “kick” determines along which side the ball rolls down the hill. In either case, the Rt(y) 
curves do not make any sense, and thus the W(y) mechanism cannot survive. 
In setting 3, figure 11 indicates a third pattern of divergence: the two regression 
coefficients oscillate around their respective equilibrium values, but the amplitudes of the 
oscillations increase drastically (the plot is truncated at t = 14, in order to see the start of 
oscillation). It seems that the disturbances trigger the “resonance” of the system, as if the W(y) 
mechanism alternates between the two tendencies of “collapse” and “explosion.” 
Now it becomes clear that settings 2 and 3, though judged inhabitable for the W(y) 
mechanism by the static model, are subject to the vulnerability to disturbance, and thus cannot 
sustain the W(y) mechanism. Even if the disturbances are small and one-time, they are sufficient 
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to “kick the ball down the hill”—to cause the W(y) flocking mechanism to collapse, explode, or 
resonate. It should be noted that, in such cases, the Rt(y) curve does not really collapse to zero, 
nor really explode or resonate toward infinity. As mentioned before, the current model only 
addresses the near-equilibrium behavior of the W(y) mechanism, but does not capture the 
dynamics when the mechanism is far from equilibrium. In reality, the market capacity must set 
limits on its diverging path. But, there is one thing for sure: the W(y) mechanism cannot survive 
in such settings. 
The analytical condition for judging if a specific market setting is vulnerable to 
disturbance is derived in appendix B. It follows that many market settings judged inhabitable for 
the W(y) mechanism by White’s model in all three viable regions (White 1981b, p. 527, fig. 3) 
are not inhabitable due to vulnerability to disturbance. 
Taking into account both kinds of dynamic instability (the off-equilibrium unreliability 
and vulnerability to disturbance), the W(y) mechanism can hardly survive in any market setting, 
under the condition of no (or very low) quality ambiguity. However, the mechanism does seem to 
exist in some, perhaps not too few, real markets (e.g., White 1981b; Uzzi and Lancaster 2004; 
Chiffoleau and Laporte 2006). A natural speculation is that, in most real markets, the (absolute) 
quality ambiguity is not that low, so that the W(y) mechanism may be still viable. Then, one has 
to 1) prove that higher absolute quality ambiguity leads to increased viability of the mechanism, 
and 2) to find if such a relation holds in the whole range of absolute quality ambiguity, or just 




Figure 9: The “collapse” of the Rt(y) curve (Setting 2) 
 
 
Figure 10: The “Explosion” of the Rt(y) Curve (Setting 2) 
 










































Figure 11: The “Resonance” of the Rt(y) Curve (Setting 3) 
 
 























Chapter 5 Uncertainty as Stabilizer 
 
In this chapter, the absolute quality ambiguity σ is no longer fixed at zero. Instead, it is 
increased stepwise. The effects of this increase on the two kinds of dynamic instability of the 
W(y) flocking mechanism are then examined, and the implications for the viability of the 
mechanism are discussed, with the assistance of propositions 1 to 4. The three simulation settings 
above are used again here to illustrate such effects. It should be emphasized that although only 
three simulation settings are used, the results are representative for other market settings judged 
inhabitable for the W(y) mechanism by White’s model.  
 
Increasing Off-equilibrium Reliability 
The problem of off-equilibrium unreliability results from the fact that when the absolute 
quality ambiguity in the market is low, the predictions provided by the W(y) flocking mechanism 
are very unreliable and the realized market outcomes deviate systematically from the predicted 
ones. Now consider the situation in which the absolute quality ambiguity σ is no longer zero, still 
using setting one as an example. Everything remains the same, except that eleven levels of σ are 
specified: from 0 to 0.25 with increments of 0.025. The highest level of σ is set such that the 
“normal range” of each firm’s quality exactly reaches the mean quality of the firm(s) with 
neighboring quality, i.e., 2σ = Δn. At each level of absolute quality ambiguity, 100 iterations are 
run, that is, T = 100. Outcomes of interest are the other three market uncertainties: relative 
quality ambiguity (measured with eq. 8), predictive uncertainty (measured with eq. 3 and 4), and 
recognitive uncertainty (eq. 1). With the sizes of these uncertainties, the viability of the W(y) 
mechanism can be evaluated according to the four propositions. All the measured uncertainties at 
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each level of σ are obtained by averaging over time T. The simulation results are plotted in figure 
12, with the level of absolute quality ambiguity as the independent variable. Note that the scale 
of the measures is not very informative, what matters is the tendency. 
It is clear from figure 12 that when σ is zero, what endangers the W(y) mechanism is high 
predictive uncertainty (proposition 2). As the absolute quality ambiguity increases, predictive 
uncertainty falls, making the survival of the W(y) mechanism possible. What is even more 
important than the reduced size of predictive uncertainty is the fact that the deviation of the 
realized market outcomes from the Rt(y) curves becomes less systematic when the absolute 
quality ambiguity is relatively higher. This is illustrated by figure 13 where the predicted 
revenue-volume pairs (the X’s) and the realized ones (the dots) of three firms (with respective 
mean qualities n1, n2, and n3) are plotted along with the equilibrium W(y) curve; the 
corresponding σ is 0.225. Compared with figure 6 (with no quality ambiguity), in which the 
realized outcomes (the dots) reveal a clear pattern deviating from the W(y) curve, those in figure 
13 seem more evenly and randomly scattered around the W(y) curve (and also the Rt(y) curves, 
which are not plotted). This suggests that in this setting the Rt(y) curves can provide seemingly 
more credible predictions, for all firms in the market, of the sales revenues corresponding to 
various volumes. Thus, for each run, the firms have good reasons to accept the fitted Rt(y) curve 
as their revenue curve. This result also holds in all other possible market parameter settings.  
The reason for reduced predictive uncertainty and less systematic deviation is that as 
absolute quality ambiguity increases, consumers become less critical or “picky” about product 
quality, so the sharp valuation curves expand to “fuzzy” valuation bands (see figure 5). As a 
result, consumers are more tolerant of the deviation of the firms’ offers, and thus the firms’ 
(randomly) deviated offers are more likely to be accepted. Metaphorically, the role of the 
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absolute quality ambiguity in the W(y) flocking mechanism is akin to that of lubricant—it makes 
the originally rigid, brittle, and friction-fraught system more flexible, robust, and smooth.  
 
Figure 12: The Predictive, Recognitive Uncertainties and Relative Quality Ambiguity against 
Absolute Quality Ambiguity (Setting 1). 
 
Figure 13: The Realized (the dots) and Predicted (the X’s) Revenues and Volumes (Setting 1; σ = 
0.225), Along with the W(y) Curve in Equilibrium. 










































However, reduced predictive uncertainty generates greater relative quality ambiguity 
(assuming that Δn, the distances between the mean qualities of firms with neighboring quality 
distributions, are constant),38 and increases recognitive uncertainty (see figure 12).39
 
 Thus, if the 
absolute quality ambiguity is too high, the resulting relative quality ambiguity and recognitive 
uncertainty would be too high for the W(y) mechanism to survive (propositions 1 and 4). This 
leads to the following conclusion: 
Conclusion 3: the W(y) mechanism (i.e. competition-informed pricing) is only viable in 
some middle range of absolute quality ambiguity. If the absolute quality ambiguity is either 
too low or too high, the mechanism would be nonviable. 
 
Strengthening Robustness to Disturbance 
Having illustrated the role of absolute quality ambiguity in increasing the off-equilibrium 
reliability of the W(y) flocking mechanism, it is now time to examine its effects on vulnerability 
to disturbance. Simulation settings 2 and 3 are again used as examples. Eleven levels of σ are 
specified for each setting in the same manner as in setting 1. However, the outcome of interest 
now becomes the timing of the start of divergence—“collapse,” “explosion,” or “resonance”—of 
the fitted Rt(y) curves at each level of σ. Such timing can be observed from the simulation 
                                                             
38 In another simulation not shown here, as absolute quality ambiguity σ is increased stepwise, the quality distance 
Δn is also increased accordingly, such that relative quality ambiguity is kept constant. However, this does not change 
the directions of the trajectories of predictive uncertainty and recognitive uncertainty in figure 12. Thus, conclusion 
3 still holds.  
 
39 Note that the recognitive uncertainty measured here tends to be under-estimated. Spoiled by the increased 
consumer tolerance, firms are emboldened to make more deviating offers, which would increase the variation in 
market outcomes. This possibility is not considered here, since the firm’s tendency to deviate is assumed constant, as 




trajectories of the two estimated regression coefficients, B0t and B1t, of the Rt(y) curves.  
    The simulations reveal a general tendency: the larger the σ, the later the divergence 
starts. By plotting the time trajectories of the logarithm of the estimated coefficient B0t, figures 
14 and 15 show, for settings 2 and 3 respectively, the different timings of divergence at three 
levels of σ. Since the divergences of the two regression coefficients are almost synchronized, 
only one coefficient is plotted. The two figures demonstrate the general tendency. Increased 
absolute quality ambiguity tends to delay the divergence of the W(y) mechanism; with σ 
sufficiently large, the mechanism becomes rather stable. 
Metaphorically, the reason for the increased robustness to disturbances is that the 
existence of absolute quality ambiguity “cuts off” the crest of the mountain and makes the 
mountain a mesa, and the tableland formed at the top represents some local semi-stable 
equilibrium. The equilibrium state is only semi-stable because after experiencing some one-time 
disturbance, the ball on the tableland would not return to its original place, nor would it keep 
rolling away down the hill; rather, it would stay at some location near the original place. The 
equilibrium state is only local because the semi-stability holds only within the area of the 
tableland: if the disturbances are big enough to “kick” the ball off the edge, the ball would keep 
rolling away.  
If the disturbances are small enough and their directions are largely random, their effects 
on the ball would cancel out each other, and the overall effect would be that the ball would 
always stay near the original place. The greater the absolute quality ambiguity, the larger the 
portion of the mountain crest removed, the larger the area of the tableland, and thus the greater 
the ability to resist occasionally extra-large disturbances. This is why increased absolute quality 
ambiguity can strengthen the W(y) mechanism’s robustness to disturbances, and make it feasible 
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in those settings otherwise uninhabitable (such as settings 2 and 3). However, this is achieved at 
the expense of higher relative quality ambiguity40
 
 and recognitive uncertainty. Therefore, 
although some level of absolute quality ambiguity is necessary to the stability of the W(y) 
flocking mechanism, too much of absolute quality ambiguity would undermine and even nullify 
such benefit, as the result of increased relative quality ambiguity and recognitive uncertainty. 
This leads to the same conclusion as conclusion 3. See appendix B for a more technical 
explanation of the rationale for this phenomenon. 
 
Figure 14: The Timing of Divergence (Setting 2) 
(Notes: dotted line: σ = 0; solid line: σ = 0.4; dashed horizontal line: σ =0.8)  
 
                                                             
40 In another simulation not shown here, as absolute quality ambiguity σ is increased stepwise, the quality distance 
Δn is also increased accordingly, such that relative quality ambiguity is kept constant. However, this does not change 
the tendency shown in figure 14. Thus, the conclusion remains the same.  
 




















Figure 15: The Timing of Divergence (Setting 3) 
(Notes: dotted line: σ = 0; solid line: σ = 0.4; dashed horizontal line: σ =0.8)    


















In this chapter, the viability conditions for different pricing practices—the W(y) 
mechanism (or competition-informed pricing), value-informed, and cost informed pricing—are 
first summarized according to propositions 1 to 4, and conclusions 1 to 3. The current theory is 
then used to explain the distribution of different pricing practices in the case of the Burgundy 
wine market. Some evidence supporting the current theory in existing studies, its immediate 
theoretical and practical implications, and a future research agenda are also discussed.  
    To facilitate summary, all market settings discussed in this dissertation are placed on a 
plane in figure 16 spanned by two independent variables: the absolute quality ambiguity σ and 
the distance between two neighboring mean qualities Δn. The two dotted horizontal lines roughly 
divide the plane into three areas. From bottom to top, they respectively represent low (L), 
medium (M), and high (H) absolute quality ambiguity. The two dashed rays from the origin also 
roughly divide the plane into three areas: from left to right, they respectively represent high, 
medium, and low relative quality ambiguity (see eq. 8). Thus, the four lines together divide the 
plane into nine regions, each of which corresponds to a unique combination of the levels of 
absolute and relative quality ambiguity. These combinations are denoted by two letters, the first 
referring to the level of absolute quality ambiguity, and the second to the level of relative quality 
ambiguity. For example, the region marked with “LH” has low absolute and high relative quality 
ambiguity; the region with “HL” has high absolute and low relative quality ambiguity. Now the 
















Figure 16: The Topology of Quality Ambiguities and the Viability of Pricing Practices (Notes: 
horizontally shaded area: competition-informed pricing; vertically shaded: value-informed 
pricing; no shade: cost-informed pricing) 
 
In the three regions at the top of the plane (HH, HM, HL) having high absolute quality 
ambiguity, both the W(y) mechanism and value-informed pricing are nonviable. Value-informed 
pricing is nonviable because high absolute quality ambiguity suggests that consumers have no 
clear valuation of the products in the first place, let alone the firm’s possibility of revealing it 
(proposition 3). The W(y) mechanism is nonviable because high absolute quality ambiguity gives 
rise to high recognitive uncertainty (figure 12), which compromises the firm’s ability to fit the 
Rt(y) curves or its confidence in it (proposition 1, conclusion 3), and for region HH, high relative 
quality ambiguity would also make the mechanism nonviable (proposition 4). For the two 
regions on the left (MH, LH), the W(y) mechanism and value-informed pricing are not viable 
either, since the high relative quality ambiguity undermines product differentiation, which is the 
very basis of the two pricing mechanism/practices (proposition 4). In these five regions, only 
cost-informed pricing is viable, because its focus on the internal cost structure of the firm, to a 
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large extent, guards the firm from both quality ambiguities.  
For the remaining four regions, the W(y) mechanism can only occupy the two regions 
(MM, ML) with medium level of absolute quality ambiguity (conclusion 3), but cannot survive 
in the other two (LM, LL) with low absolute quality ambiguity (conclusion 2). Low absolute 
quality ambiguity endangers the flocking model of competition-informed pricing with two 
dynamic instabilities—off-equilibrium unreliability and vulnerability to disturbance. 
Value-informed pricing is only viable in the two regions (LM, LL) with low absolute 
quality ambiguity (conclusion 1). The survival of value-informed pricing relies heavily on the 
existence of rather clear valuations of products by consumers, which, in turn, rely on the 
relatively unambiguous evaluation of product quality. This concludes the summary of the 
viability conditions for different pricing practices. 
It should be emphasized that this categorization of the “continuous distributions” of 
quality ambiguities is oversimplified. In reality, the shapes of the “territories” of these pricing 
mechanism/practices would be “distorted,” and their boundaries would be blurred. The territories, 
to some extent, would also overlap with each other. These complications in reality are also 
reflected in the fact that for each firm, the adopted pricing practice tends to be, more or less, a 
hybrid of all three. However, these practical issues are left for future empirical research; for the 
purpose of this dissertation, it suffices to provide a somewhat idealized theoretical map, which 
serves as the baseline against which various deviations and distortions can be further studied. 
Even in its current crude form, this map can still offer important insights into the empirical 
distribution of pricing practices.   
For example, consider again the case of the Burgundy wine market. According to 
Chiffoleau and Laporte (2006), the producers who adopt value-informed pricing are mostly those 
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owning the most prestigious appellation (highest quality/status). Producers who use cost-
informed pricing (and price takers) are mostly concentrated at the lowest end of the quality/status 
spectrum, and those who practice competition-informed pricing (the W(y) mechanism) are often 
associated with middle level quality/status. A possible explanation for this pattern is that the 
absolute and relative quality ambiguities associated with the producers’ wines are correlated with 
the mean qualities of the products: the higher the mean quality, the lower the absolute and 
relative quality ambiguities.  
This relationship is quite plausible, because a firm with high quality/status usually has 
invested a lot in advertising, networking, and cultivation of clientele, as confirmed by Chiffoleau 
and Laporte. Thus, the firm has fostered the formation of relatively consistent quality evaluation 
of its product among consumers (low absolute quality ambiguity), and has also sufficiently 
differentiated the image of its product from those of its direct competitors (low relative quality 
ambiguity).41
                                                             
41 That is, it is not the high quality/status per se that enables the firm to perform value-informed pricing (as 
commonsense or intuition may tell us). Rather, it is the low absolute and relative quality ambiguities, usually 
associated with high mean quality, that allow the firm to do so. 
 In contrast, those firms located at the lowest end of the quality spectrum may have 
no sufficient means and resources to do this (also confirmed by Chiffoleau and Laporte). Even if 
they had, they would be still reluctant to do so, because the gain, compared with the cost, may be 
minimal, given the low mean quality. Therefore, in the eyes of consumers, although they may all 
have low mean qualities, consumers cannot tell exactly how different they are from each other in 
terms of quality—they, in the eyes of consumers, even may not be worth careful evaluation, 
given the low utility to do so. The result is high absolute and relative quality ambiguities in this 
segment. Following the same logic, firms in the middle range of the quality spectrum should 




According to the map in figure 16, the whole Burgundy wine market would, thus, split 
into at least three sub-markets, with the one at the high end practicing value-informed pricing, 
the one of middle quality practicing competition-informed pricing (the W(y) mechanism), and 
the one at the low end practicing cost-informed pricing, or simply becoming price takers (as in 
perfectly competitive theory without product differentiation). This general picture is quite 
consistent with that provided by Chiffoleau and Laporte. Although they also purport to explain 
the distribution of pricing practices using appellation and sales structures as explanatory 
variables, the current theory offers a deeper and more comprehensive explanation for the 
phenomenon—the roles and effects of appellation and sales structures may themselves be some 
function of, or mediated by, the distributions of market uncertainties. 
The phenomenon of the Burgundy wine market is by no means unique. On the contrary, it 
may be quite common in empirical markets. Marketing researchers have long found a positive 
association between the successfulness of firms and the implementation of value-informed 
pricing (e.g. Cressman 2009; Dutta et al. 2003; Hinterhuber 2008; Ingenbleek 2007; Ingenbleek 
et al. 2003). They tend to interpret this association as evidence for supporting the argument that 
value-informed pricing leads to the success and high performance of firms; thus every firm, in 
principle, should adopt it. However, the current theory suggests the possibility of reversing the 
causal direction between the two: because the firms had become successful by reducing both the 
absolute and relative quality ambiguities of their products, they created the market conditions for 
implementing value-informed pricing. That is, value-informed pricing may be, to a large extent, 
a by-product of success, rather than a cause of it. 
Actually, Ingenbleek (2007) and Ingenbleek et al. (2003) have found empirical evidence 
that the effects of value-informed pricing are conditioned on the level of market uncertainty and 
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intensity of competition: high market uncertainty and intensive market competition tend to 
undermine the “positive effects” of value-informed pricing on firms’ performance. In the 
language of the current theory, “high market uncertainty” may be translated into “high absolute 
quality ambiguity,” and “intensive market competition” may be interpreted as “high relative 
quality ambiguity.” Thus, the results can be re-explained as: high absolute and relative quality 
ambiguities compromise the viability of value-informed pricing. Unfortunately, Ingenbleek et al. 
fail to consider the possible reversal of the causality, continuing to claim a “universal positive 
effect” of value-informed pricing, and thus they advocate its universal superiority over other 
pricing-practices. In contrast, a practical implication of the current theory is that firms should 
choose the pricing practices most suitable for the levels of absolute and relative quality 
ambiguities associated with its product. If a firm indeed wants to implement value-informed 
pricing, it has to first reduce the two quality ambiguities of its product to a rather low level. Then, 
the practical issue becomes one of weighing up the gains and losses of doing this. 
To further test the theory, a series of refutable hypotheses concerning the relationship 
between the prevalence of pricing practices and levels of different uncertainties can be readily 
derived from figure 16. The next step is to empirically measure the absolute and relative quality 
ambiguities of some sample of firms in some markets, and then to assess the statistical relation 
between these uncertainties and the prevalence of different pricing practices. The pricing 
orientation of firms can be obtained by survey-based studies (Ingenbleek et al. 2003), and the 
quality ambiguities of their products, though hard to measure due to their uncertain nature, may 
be indirectly captured by measuring the σ’s and Δn’s of the distributions of customer ratings, for 
example, in the “customer reviews” sections of shopping websites. This equally challenging task, 
however, is left for future research.  
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The current study has close connections to the sociological theory of status formation 
based on the conceptual distinction between (true) quality and status (Podolny 1993, 1994, 2001; 
Gould 2002; Lynn et al. 2009), though the current study emphasizes quality ambiguity as some 
irreducible uncertainty (thus questions the existence of “true quality”) and, for practical purposes, 
focuses on some generalized “quality” that subsumes status as one of its many possible 
dimensions. In this dissertation, the quality distributions of all firms are regarded as given and 
static, while the dynamic formation of these distributions is largely ignored. However, the latter 
is the very issue addressed by the status-based model (though the quality dispersion of a single 
product is not its focus). Thus, integrating the two modeling approaches may be a fruitful 
direction for future research, which may better explain how the distributions of quality 





Given the central position of the sociology of markets in economic sociology, the lack of 
theoretical and empirical attention to the price phenomenon is recognized as a “profound 
shortcoming” (Beckert 2011). Further, among the three major aspects of the price phenomenon—
qualification/valuation of goods, price mechanisms at the market and inter-firm level, and pricing 
practices at the organizational and intra-firm level—pricing practices are the least studied in 
sociology. However, it is by no means the least important, since the organizational device of 
pricing practices adopted by firms to set prices, together with price mechanisms at the market 
level, constitute two intertwined channels through which the values of goods are translated into 
prices. Without theoretically engaging pricing practices, a crucial link is missing in economic 
sociology that connects the values/valuation of goods, which has recently received much 
sociological attention, to the core issue of the price phenomenon—price formation (Beckert 2011; 
Uzzi and Lancaster 2004).  
This study addresses three interrelated questions. Why may different firms, even in the 
same market, use different pricing practices—value-informed, competition-informed, or cost-
informed pricing—to make pricing decisions? Among the three pricing practices, is there a 
universally superior one, such as competition-informed pricing implied by Harrison White’s 
market theory (White 1981a, b, 2002) or value-informed pricing promoted by marketing scholars? 
What are the market conditions for different pricing practices to survive? 
To answer these questions, this study builds a dynamic price flocking model, which cuts 
across all three aspects of the price phenomenon, to explore why and how the viability of 
different pricing practices depends on the distributions of a variety of market uncertainties. 
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Departing from Harrison White’s static W(y) market model (White 1981a, 1981b, 2002), which 
corresponds to competition-informed pricing, this study revises and extends it by introducing 
into the model the inter-dynamics among the W(y) mechanism and various market uncertainties. 
The theory implies that each kind of pricing practice is only viable under certain combinations of 
levels of different market uncertainties. Thus, this study offers a theoretical map for the 
relationship between the topology of market uncertainties and the viability of pricing practices. 
The practical implication is: contrary to what White’s theory or marketing scholars suggest, there 
is no universally superior pricing practice; the best pricing practice for a firm is contingent on the 
specific levels of uncertainties associated with its product. The theory is then used to explain the 
distribution of pricing practices in the case of the Burgundy wine market.  
The current study also contributes to the sociological research on uncertainty. The existing 
literature views uncertainty as either “undesirable” or “desirable.” The “undesirable” view of 
uncertainty argues that the existence of uncertainties undermines social actors’ ability to make 
(the “right”) decisions and coordinate with each other, and thus constantly threats to disrupt 
social order (or hinder its emergence) and lead to chaos. To impose (or sustain) social order, 
certain social mechanisms or structures must be invoked to reduce or even eliminate 
uncertainties. In contrast, the “desirable” view of uncertainty sees uncertainties as some “assets” 
that should be capitalized rather than “liabilities” that should be gotten rid of, because the 
ambiguous situations generated by uncertainties suggest opportunities for social actors to break 
free from the over-determined constraints imposed by the existing social order and to gain profits 
and advantages (Knight 1921; Stark 2009). Despite the opposition at the surface, the two views 
share the same underlying logic—uncertainty is disruptive to existing social order.  
However, the current study challenges this “commonsense:” the existence of some 
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uncertainty may well enhance the stability of social order. The role of uncertainty is not merely 
as some logical precondition for invoking certain social mechanisms/structures to manage it—
just as in the statement “because uncertainty A exists, mechanism/structure B is invoked to deal 
with it.” Rather, uncertainty may be indispensible and internal to the normal functioning of social 
mechanisms, as is illustrated by the case of the W(y) flocking mechanism. The absolute quality 
ambiguity, conceptualized as some tolerance interval shared by market actors, is akin to some 
lubricant: it makes the otherwise rigid, brittle, and friction-fraught social order—the “interface 
discipline” (White 2002)—imposed by the W(y) mechanism more smooth, robust, and error-
tolerant.  
Quality ambiguity/uncertainty is an important kind of uncertainty that has received a great 
deal of theoretical attention from both sociologists and economists. The problem of quality 
ambiguity is usually formulated as one of asymmetric information. That is, it is assumed that 
there is some “true” quality associated with a certain product, and the only problem is the 
unavailability of reliable information revealing this “true” quality to the buyer/consumer. After 
the buyer purchases and uses this product for a while, the “true” quality is revealed. However, 
such a formulation makes sense only when the standards and procedures for evaluating quality 
are quite clear and consistent among both consumers and producers. In reality, as is implied by 
the recent scholarship of marketing research and the sociology of performativity (e.g., Finch 
2010; Kjellberg 2007; Kjellberg and Helgesson 2006; Callon et al. 2002; Callon and Muniesa 
2005), there are ambiguities and discrepancies intrinsic in the standards, procedures, and 
processes both producers and consumers use to evaluate and compare qualities, individually or 
collectively. Thus, strictly speaking, there is no “true” quality; rather, there is only mean quality 
and distribution of quality surrounding the mean. The question addressed here is not how social 
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mechanisms reduce quality ambiguity and impose market order, but rather the role of the 
persisting quality ambiguity, as some non-negligible irreducible uncertainty faced by both sides 
of transaction, in the functioning of the social mechanisms maintaining market order. 
As the relationship between uncertainty and social order has been a unifying theme in 
economic sociology (and sociology in general), this dissertation may open up a new line of 
inquiry that has important implications for a wide range of research. Existing studies have given 
detailed accounts of a variety of social constructs that manage uncertainties, such as status, 
networks, culture and institution; some studies further demonstrate that different mechanisms are 
invoked in response to different kinds or levels of uncertainties (e.g., Beckman, Haunschild, and 
Phillips 2004; DiMaggio and Louch 1998; Peterson 1997; Podolny 2001). However, these 
studies more or less follow a common logic: “because uncertainty A (or B) exists, mechanism C 
(or D) is invoked to deal with it.” This, as illustrated herein, does not give adequate consideration 
to the inter-dynamics between uncertainties and social mechanisms. Mechanism A may indeed 
reduce uncertainty C, but at the same time may increase uncertainties E and F, which may in turn 
affect the functioning of mechanism A. Moreover, the changes in these uncertainties may not be 
evenly distributed among social actors. Then how do these complications feedback to the social 
mechanism at work and the evolving market order? 
For example, in the status-based theory, some status hierarchy may arise in a market to 
reduce quality ambiguity through a mechanism in which firms tend to establish ties with those of 
similar status (Podolny 1994). This clustering process based on status homophily may reduce 
absolute quality ambiguity in the whole market, as one can recognize a high (or low) quality firm 
by the statuses of its associates. However, this process may increase relative quality ambiguity 
among firms within a status cluster, because the clustering makes the perceived qualities of these 
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firms closer to each other and thus decreases the quality differentiation among them. A result 
might be intensified competition among the firms within each status cluster. Moreover, these 
changes in absolute and relative quality ambiguities may not be evenly distributed among firms 
and status clusters. Then, how would these diverging changes in different uncertainties affect the 
status actions of firms at the micro-level and the evolving shape of the status hierarchy at the 
macro-level (see also Sauder, Lynn, and Podolny 2012)? Would the status hierarchy finally settle 
down in some equilibrium, or the actors introduce some other mechanism(s) to either counteract 
the effects of the changing uncertainties or even replace the status-based mechanism? What are 
the conditions for triggering each of these different courses? 
Similar considerations may well apply to other traditions of sociological research on 
uncertainty, suggesting promising avenues for future research.  A general implication is: 
uncertainties, and the inter-dynamics among them, should be treated as an endogenous and 
integral part of the social mechanism at issue, rather than some amorphous “other” external to it. 
This study, through a fine-grained analysis of different market uncertainties and their inter-
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    The following derives the equilibrium market profile R(y), formed when value-informed 
pricing, rather than the W(y) mechanism, is at work.  
    The firm’s cost function is  
( ; ) /c dC y n qy n= .                                                    (A1) 
    The consumers’ valuation function is  
( ; )
a bry nV y n
θ
= .                                                       (A2) 
Since the firm can somehow estimate the valuation function of consumers, (A2) is 
supposed to be known to the firm, and thus is also the firm’s revenue function: 
 R(y) = V(y; n)                                                          (A3) 
    The necessary condition for the net cash flow of a firm, R(y) - C(y; n), to achieve 
maximum is  
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    Solving for y yields the optimal production value y*(n). However, here we solve for n 
first,  
1/( )
( ) /( )
b d
c a b dqcn y
ra
θ + − + =  
 
.                                             (A6) 




/( ) /( )
( )/( )( )
b b d d b d
ad cb b dqc rR y y
a θ
+ +
+ +   =    
   
.                                    (A7) 
    Define B as 
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    Thus (A7) can be rewritten as  
  /( )( )/( ) b b dad cb bR y B y ++ =   .                                               (A9) 
    Comparing (A9) and (A8) with the expression for White’s W(y) curve (White 1981b, 
p.525, eq. 5, and p.529, eq. 11), it can be seen that R(y) and W(y) have rather similar expressions, 
except that the constant B is slightly different from the coefficient A in W(y), and that there is no 
constant k in (A9). 
    Now I derive the (static) viability condition for the curve R(y). Two conditions must be 
satisfied for the curve R(y) to be viable. First, every firm’s net income must be positive.  Second, 
the net income achieves its (local) maximum. The mathematical expressions for the two 
conditions are 
   ( ; ) ( ; ) 0V y n C y n− >  , and                                           (A10) 
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    Substituting (A1) and (A2) into (A10) and (A11) yields 
a c b dq y n
r
θ − +< , and                                                  (A12) 
( 1) ( 1)a c b d qa a y n c c
r
θ− +  − < − 
 
.                                         (A13) 
    Then, this leads to the condition for the R(y) curve to be viable: 
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c>a.                                                                 (A14) 
Appendix B 
 
In this appendix, the conditions for the presence (and absence) of vulnerability to 
disturbance in the price flocking model are discussed. 
First, under the conditions of no quality ambiguity and no disturbances (i.e., σ, εit’s, and 
δit’s are all zero), the dynamic W(y) model specified in this paper can be reformulated as a 
deterministic iterative mapping. To see this, look at the process from run t to run t+1. In run t, 
each firm i makes an optimal output decision yit* maximizing its profit, and the optimal output 
decisions made by all the I firms in the market can be denoted by a vector Yt = [y1t*, y2t*, …, yIt*]T. 
These volumes of outputs are sold in the market with the respective sales revenues R’t = [R’1t, 
R’2t, …, R’It]T; each R’it is determined by eq. 10 with Ni = ni. In run t+1, each firm i uses the data 
[Yt, R’t] to fit a Rt+1(y) curve in the functional form specified in eq. 15 (or 16), and treats it as its 
revenue curve in run t+1. Then each firm finds its new optimal volume of output yi(t+1)* by 
maximizing its profit Rt+1(y) - C(y; ni). All these output decisions together form the new vector 
Yt+1 = [y1(t+1)*, y2(t+1)*, …, yI(t+1)*]T. Thus, the whole process can be formulated as a nonlinear 
iterative mapping F: ℝI  ℝI (where ℝI is the vector space with I dimensions), so that Yt+1 = 
F(Yt) (for t = 0, 1, …), where F is completely determined by the market parameters and 
simulation parameters (e.g., those in tables 1 and 2).  
The existence of the equilibrium W(y) curve is equivalent to the existence of some point 
Y* = [y1*, y2*, …, yI*]T in the ℝI space, satisfying Y* = F(Y*). The point Y* is called a fixed point 
with respect to mapping F. The existence of the fixed-point Y* can be easily judged by, and 
obtained from, the static W(y) model. Then, the issue of the vulnerability of the equilibrium to 
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disturbances can be transformed to the issue of the stability of the fixed point Y*: that is, to see, 
for any random initial small disturbances ΔY to Y*, if the mapping F can lead the sequence 
{Yt}t=0,1,…, with Y0 = Y*+ΔY and Yt+1 = F(Yt), return to the fixed point Y*. If it can, Y* is called an 
attracting or stable fixed point with respect to F, i.e., there exists a neighborhood S(Y*, δ) of Y* 
(some open sphere centering on Y* with radius δ), such that, for any Y0 ∈ S(Y*, δ), the sequence 
{Yt}t=0,1,… generated by F converges to Y* as t  ∞. If Y* is an attracting fixed point, the 
corresponding equilibrium is locally stable and robust to disturbances. The theorem below gives 
a sufficient condition for judging if a specific equilibrium of the mechanism is locally stable. 
 
Theorem B1: (F’|Y*) is the Jacobian matrix of F evaluated at Y*. The elements of the I×I 
Jacobian matrix are all the first-order partial derivatives of F evaluated at Y*. ρ(·) stands for 
the spectral radius of a matrix—the maximum among the absolute values of all eigenvalues 
of the matrix. 
For any nonlinear mapping F: ℝI  ℝI, if there exists a fixed point Y* with respect to F, 
and F is differentiable at Y*, then, 
if ρ(F’|Y*) < 1, the fixed point Y* is (locally) stable, and thus robust to disturbances; 
if ρ(F’|Y*) > 1, Y* is unstable, and thus vulnerable to disturbances; 
if ρ(F’|Y*) = 1, Y* can be either stable or unstable, so further conditions are needed. 
 
A proof of this theorem can be found in Ortega and Rheinboldt (1970, p.299-307). This 
theorem is widely used in searching for numerical solutions of nonlinear equations using 
iterative methods, and also in analyzing the stability of control systems. To get some flavor of the 
rationale for it, one can verify its correctness in the one-dimensional case. In such a case, F is 
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reduced to some real-valued nonlinear function f(y) with a single argument y; the existence of the 
fixed point is equivalent to the existence of some real number y* satisfying y* = f(y*); the 
Jacobian matrix reduces to f ’(y*), the first-order derivative of f evaluated at y*; the spectral radius 
reduces to the absolute value of f ’(y*). 
Note that although the theorem is incapable of judging the stability of the fixed point when 
ρ(F’|Y*) = 1, this would not be a serious issue in practice. The reason is, in empirical markets, the 
case in which the value of ρ(F’|Y*) is exactly equal to 1 is extremely rare, if not impossible.  
To apply this theorem to the three simulation settings used in this paper, their respective 
Jacobian matrices evaluated at equilibrium and the corresponding spectral radiuses are calculated, 
using the “symbolic math toolbox” provided by the mathematical software MatLab (the codes 
are available upon request). The derivation and calculation are extremely tedious and 
complicated, though not difficult in principle, so it is almost impossible to do it without 
computer assistance. The spectral radius for setting 1 is 0.5 < 1, thus setting 1 is stable; the 
spectral radiuses for settings 2 and 3 are equal to 2 and 1.33, respectively, both greater than 1 and 
thus unstable. These results are consistent with those given by the simulations. 
In the case when the absolute quality ambiguity σ is no longer zero, the valuation curves 
of consumers becomes fuzzy bands. This changes the nature of the original mapping F, which 
makes the equilibrium locally semi-stable.  
 
